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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pop quiz: What do all these cases have in common? 
• A father dies intestate.  His son claims that he is the 
sole heir because the deceased man’s wife is a 
postoperative male-to-female transsexual, and hence 
the marriage certificate issued by the State of Kansas is 
invalid.1 
• A husband sues for divorce on the grounds of adultery 
because his wife has had an affair with another woman.  
 
       †  Kris Franklin is a Professor of Law at New York Law School.  Professor 
Franklin wishes to thank the members of the N.Y. Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual & 
Transexual Faculty Reading Group, together with the NYLS Junior Faculty 
Colloquium, especially Seth Harris and Pamela Champine, for their insightful 
comments on earlier drafts.  And as always, her appreciation for Sarah E. Chinn, 
whose help made this piece possible. 
 1. Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002). 
1
Franklin: The "Authoritative Moment": Exploring the Boundaries of Interpret
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
07FRANKLIN.DOC 1/20/2006  4:17:31 PM 
656 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
The woman insists that the divorce action must be 
brought as a no-fault claim, because a same-sex 
relationship does not qualify as adulterous under New 
Hampshire law.2 
• Two parents of the same sex are granted an order of 
adoption in the District of Columbia.  The child was 
born in Virginia, which does not permit second-parent 
adoption and explicitly prohibits legal recognition of 
same-sex partnerships.  The parents claim that the 
State of Virginia is obliged, in accordance with the D.C. 
court’s order, to reissue the child’s birth certificate, 
listing both of them as legal parents.3 
• A lesbian couple petitions for name changes so that 
they may share a common surname.  The New Jersey 
trial court rejects their petition for fear that granting it 
would inappropriately suggest that the women have a 
partnership acknowledged under New Jersey law.  The 
women appeal, arguing that, barring deliberate fraud, 
they should be permitted to change their names for 
any reason they choose.4 
While they are grounded in quite disparate bodies of law, all of 
these cases ask the courts to think about the growing elasticity in 
cultural understandings of families in the United States, and to 
make decisions about where to draw the line in defining the 
legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of different kinds of families.  Indeed, 
the question of what constitutes a family is perhaps one of the more 
contentious that American culture has been asking itself in recent 
decades.5  This question is not insignificant or simply technical—it 
reaches into every corner of our personal, social, juridical, 
financial, and religious lives, and generates any number of other 
lines of inquiry.  Which relationships are sanctioned by the state or 
by religious institutions?  How do we define who is a parent?  Are 
these changes in family forms genuinely new modes of human 
relation or are they simply variations on pre-existing themes?  What 
is the connection between the health of the polity and the 
 
 2. In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010 (N.H. 2003). 
 3. Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366 (Va. 2005). 
 4. In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 5. See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY (Daniel Patrick Moynihan et al. eds., 
2004) (explaining that Americans are reexamining definitions of family and 
assessing new family structures, primarily in a heterosexual context). 
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narrowness or breadth of family definition? 
An important component of (and often a catalyst to) this crisis 
of definition has been the steady increase in cases dealing with 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT)6 people asserting 
various family rights in the courts.  Its most explosive manifestation 
has been the fraught and sometimes vitriolic struggles over the 
institution of marriage, and the possibility of extending the legal 
rights of marriage to lesbian and gay couples.  However, gay 
marriage is only the most visible element of a variety of shifts within 
family definition; along with struggles to achieve (or prevent) the 
extension of marriage to same-sex couples, the courts have been 
faced with queer parents petitioning for equal legal relationship to 
their children, transgendered people and their spouses arguing for 
(or against) the legitimacy of their chosen identities, and lesbian 
and gay couples negotiating the separation of their relationships 
and guardianship of children in the absence of legal marriage, to 
name just a few issues. 
LGBT family law poses particularly vexed questions because 
the ways queer people construct our lives may not be recognized in 
law.  But families are as much defined by legal definitions as they 
are by affect ional bonds or cultural approbation.  All family 
constructions, even informal and non-legal, may eventually 
intersect with the law, even if the connection is one of non-
recognition, or the denial of recognition.7 
This Article examines the cultural riptide the courts are 
wading into when grappling with these issues—what makes a family 
and who gets to decide.  Courts deciding to extend legal 
recognition to new family forms, especially in the hotly-politicized 
 
 6. When dealing with sexual and gender minorities, nomenclature is always 
an issue.  Throughout this essay I use “LGBT,” “queer,” and “gay” somewhat 
interchangeably (particularly in the phrases “gay families” and “queer families” 
which could, in this discussion, mean same-sex couples with or without children, 
couples one or both of whose members is transgendered, or families whose legal 
conflict stems from the homosexuality, bisexuality, or transgender status of one of 
its members), mostly for the sake of brevity.  At the same time, I am very much 
alert to the fact that the legal, personal, and political issues facing people who 
identify through sexual orientation are quite different from those whose identity is 
organized around gender transition (not to mention those people for whom these 
issues powerfully intersect). 
 7. For a discussion of the ways in which non-traditional families may try to 
replicate some of the rights automatically afforded to legally recognized family 
relationships, see Angie Smolka, That’s the Ticket: A New Way of Defining Family, 10 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 629, 636-38 (2001). 
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queer contexts, face charges of overstepping their authority.  That 
is, of engaging in “judicial activism.”8  But law generally, and 
perhaps especially family law, is inherently fact-driven, 
individualized, and subject to significant discretion.9  Courts 
examining questions of family definition, especially state courts 
interpreting state laws, frequently have a great deal of latitude.10  So 
in the context of changing cultural notions of family constitution, 
especially the increasing recognition that gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgender people form their own families in need of legal 
acknowledgement, it can at the very least be disingenuous to 
suggest, as commentators frequently do,11 that courts recognizing 
queer families are taking drastic steps, while implying that those 
 
 8. Of course, “activist” decision-making is in the eye of the beholder.  As 
many observers have argued, “judicial activism cannot be said to be either 
conservative or liberal by nature.”  Joseph A. Reinert, The Myth of Judicial Activism, 
29 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 35, 35 (2004); see also Adam Cohen, Psst . . . Justice Scalia . . . 
You know, You’re an Activist Judge, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at A20.  For a 
searching discussion on the history and significance of the term, see Keenan D. 
Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441 
(2004). 
 9. Virtually all introductions to U.S. family law note that domestic relations 
statutes are drafted as general guidelines, and that courts are given broad 
discretion to resolve specific disputes.  For but one example of such commentary, 
see JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 2-3 (3d ed. 2005). 
 10. Though courts’ latitude and responsibilities will necessarily differ 
depending on whether their work is based in interpretation of statutes, common 
law, or constitutional law.  These forms of reasoning have significant conceptual 
overlap, but each works from its own body of authority, and each has unique 
properties.  As a result, however, scholars tend to talk about them as entirely 
distinct from one another, which deprives us of the opportunities to examine 
points where their varying tracks might run parallel, or even converge.  While 
acknowledging the difficulty of talking about how courts deal with three such 
disparate bodies and sources of law, this Article tries to bridge the gaps, and to 
find common ground among their approaches to the questions of queer family 
definition. 
 11. Recently, the pejorative categorization “activist judges” has become 
almost code for “judges who would find constitutional protection for gay 
marriage.”  The call for a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage 
was nearly-universally predicated upon the need to protect the U.S. Constitution 
from the threat of “activist judges.”  See, e.g., George W. Bush, President Calls for 
Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2005); Same-Sex Marriage Senate Battle Over, War is Not, CNN, July 14, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/14/samesex.marriage/index.html 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2005) (quoting President Bush’s comments about “activist 
judges’” continued efforts “to redefine traditional marriage”; Senator Bill Frist 
asking whether “activist judges” would “destroy the institution of marriage”; and 
Senator Orrin Hatch’s comments that the amendment would protect the 
institution “that a few unelected judges” were trying to change). 
4
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denying such legal recognition are simply “applying the law.” 
To see where the boundaries of judicial interpretation of 
family definitions lie, this Article examines and contrasts state court 
opinions that take sharply differing views of their own interpretive 
power in LGBT family law cases.12  Though each opinion must rest 
squarely on the statutes and precedents of its own jurisdiction, by 
juxtaposing them and examining their reasoning and rhetoric, I 
hope to show that arguments on each side of the debate can be 
weakly-supported or can rest on solid interpretive foundations.  
More importantly, within the boundaries of each jurisdiction’s 
body of substantive law, arguments favoring each position—finding 
for or against the recognition of LGBT families—can be equally 
“legal.”  There is something profoundly inaccurate, perhaps even 
dishonest, in describing rulings against queer families as engaging 
in legal analysis, while suggesting that decisions in favor of those 
same families are infused with politics. 
I suggest, moreover, that quite aside from the relevant statutes 
and precedents with which the courts must grapple, much of the 
action in these decisions actually takes place at the site where the 
court does, or in some instances does not, examine the limits of its 
own interpretive power.  That is because this “authoritative 
moment” in many ways indicates a crossroads at which a court must 
decide which direction it wants to go, before it comes to any 
substantial determination.13  It is the moment at which courts ask:  
Are we empowered to decide this case at all?  If so, what are the 
terms on which we are empowered, and what are the limits on our 
jurisdictional mandate? 
In queer family law cases (and perhaps many others, though 
 
 12. I began my research by gathering as many queer family law decisions from 
2000 to early 2005 as I could find.  These date restrictions were imposed to limit 
the scope of my examination, but also because the enormous changes in cultural 
and political attitudes toward gay and transgender people and their families in 
recent years suggest that older opinions might not have current cultural 
resonance, even if they still stand as binding legal precedent.  But I did not adhere 
rigidly to these limitations.  In some instances, older decisions were so significant 
that I felt compelled to include them.  Moreover, though I have attempted to 
make my pool of potential sources as complete as possible, this paper is not 
intended to offer a statistical survey, and I certainly do not discuss here, nor do I 
purport to include, every possible opinion that fits within the parameters that I set. 
 13. This temporal reference can be confusing, though.  It is certainly true 
that the methodological discussion tends to be placed in an opinion after a 
recitation of the facts of the case, and just before the discussion of the court’s legal 
reasoning.  This makes sense given the logic of a legal opinion, but it does not 
necessarily follow that this is the order of the decision maker’s reasoning. 
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that is well beyond the scope of this Article) the authoritative 
moment embodies the collisions and resolutions of many smaller 
and correlated determinations.  If we unpack all the different 
strands and directions of thinking that are implicitly recognized, 
packaged, and resolved within discussions of interpretive authority 
(or, equally importantly, elided in the absence of such discussions), 
then we can have a clearer idea of how many facets there are to the 
substantive rulings in these cases.  Thus, this Article asks what the 
courts are really up to when they decide such cases, and attempts to 
untangle some of the cords of thinking that are inevitably part of 
the rationales for these decisions, but that can be so invisibly 
intertwined that we as a legal community (lawyers and judges) do 
not recognize their importance. 
This Article tries to begin teasing these threads out, or, 
metaphorically, to “map the mind” of the courts.  That is, it seeks to 
understand what, and more importantly how, the courts are 
“thinking” as they decide these cases.  In so doing, we begin to see 
that only some of these strands are explicit—that is, if they really 
were neurological processes, only some would be cognitive and 
conscious.  Others, I suggest, are sympathetic,14 in that they 
reflexively take place in order for the court to reach its decision, 
but are not necessarily examined, or directly articulated in the 
court’s opinion.  This mapping of queer family law decisions is 
more than theoretical.  It matters because this way of analyzing 
what courts are doing and how they are doing it tells us something 
new about how family law is being extended or restricted across the 
country.  It helps us chart patterns of the relationship between the 
precedential, the analogical, and the methodological, which allows 
us to see the implicit factual predeterminations built into what look 
like exclusively procedural and jurisdictional conversations. 
The issues in the cases this Article examines range from 
seemingly mundane questions regarding uncontested name 
changes to unquestionably far-reaching topics of LGBT parenting 
and marriage.  But from a queer perspective, at least, (and here is 
the answer to the pop quiz) all these cases are asking the same 
 
 14. The sympathetic nervous system is autonomic, and almost completely out 
of conscious control.  For a medical definition of the term, see AMERICAN 
HERITAGE STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 809 (2002).  For a more complete 
discussion of the phrase in legal terms, see NAT’L DYSAUTONOMIA RESEARCH 
FOUND., GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE AUTONOMIC NERVOUS SYSTEM (1999), 
http://www.ndrf.org/ans.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2005). 
6
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question in different ways; are the courts willing and able to 
recognize the families we have defined for ourselves, and do we in 
fact have the power to identify ourselves and our families in 
relation to each other within the law? 
A. The Interpretive Braid 
In order to begin examining some of these under-articulated 
considerations in LGBT family law cases (and perhaps others as 
well), I describe three distinct categories of thinking that the 
opinions seem to employ.  I contend that we can understand these 
decisions as braiding together all three strands of reasoning.  The 
first and most obvious, which I dub “lex reasoning,”15 maps onto 
the substantive law at hand: either the precedent that is directly on 
point or, in the case of first impression where there is no guiding 
authority, the policy and interpretive parameters given to or taken 
on by the court.  The second and third strands, however, may be 
equally, and in some instances more, significant to the ways in 
which the courts treat these cases. 
The second thread I identify follows the courts’ factual 
reasoning, and their understanding of the cultural significance or 
cultural reality of family formation when they encounter and 
analyze LGBT families seeking legal recognition.  That is, this 
analytical thread represents the line along which the courts do or 
do not see gay family structures as analogous to families that the 
law already understands and recognizes. 
The third strand shifts our vision of LGBT family law into the 
courts’ methodological inquiry itself.  It asks how much room the 
courts imagine themselves having in order to interpret the law in 
ways that will recognize queer families.  More importantly, it 
constructs a correlation between family definitions that the law 
already accepts and sanctions (or rejects and prohibits) and the 
ways in which that law can or should be interpreted:  Broadly and 
 
 15. From the Latin “lex, legis,” meaning “law” or “rule.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “lex” in modern American jurisprudence as “a system or body 
of laws, written or unwritten, or so much thereof as may be applicable to a 
particular case or question, considered as being local or peculiar to a given state, 
country, or jurisdiction.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 908 (6th ed. 1990). 
  I use this term to refer to courts’ grappling specifically with the substance 
of their own relevant statutory and common law authority because any more 
common description of courts’ consideration of law—say “legal reasoning “ or 
“substantive reasoning”—would carry with it the implication that the other forms 
of reasoning I describe were not similarly significant. 
7
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loosely, or narrowly and restrictively. 
While this Article will not ignore the importance of the 
application of binding authority embodied in the first strand I 
discuss, my focus will be on identifying and describing the second 
and third strands of analogy and methodology.  My braid metaphor 
suggests that each of the strands I’ve named intersects with the 
others, although not necessarily at the same point.  It also suggests 
that at any given time, we can narrow our focus to see only one 
strand, examine the intersection of any two, or step back to take in 
a broader view showing how all three are ultimately woven 
together. 
Just as a braid can tie together strings of similar or quite 
different heft, I suggest that the significance of these three factors 
in a given case need not be equal.  In fact, they may be inversely 
related; if the first thread effectively shapes the decision—that is, if 
there is enough guidance in the extant body of law to tell the 
courts explicitly what to do—the court does not face an interpretive 
crisis, and can minimize or even gloss over the other two.  But in 
the kinds of cases I am looking at, statutes and precedents rarely 
provide such clear guidance.  Where the directions to the deciding 
court are minimal or nonexistent, the court needs to grapple more 
significantly with the analogical and methodological components 
of its own thinking. 
B. A Word About Gay Marriage 
Of course, at this particular moment in time the specter 
hanging over all of this discussion is the controversy about same-sex 
marriage.16  In recent months and years, several municipalities and 
state courts have generated unprecedented anxiety either by 
granting marriage licenses to same-sex couples17 or by ruling that 
 
 16. The issue has recently become hotly contested, such that the American 
Bar Association Section of Family Law, not especially known for overblown 
rhetoric, can describe gay marriage as having “burst with fury into our national 
consciousness in 2003.”  Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An 
Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic 
Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 342 (2004); see also Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. 
Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: “Same-Sex” Marriage Issue Dominates 
Headlines, 38 FAM. L.Q. 777, 777, 799-800 (2005). 
 17. In 2004 several municipalities licensed or solemnized same-sex marriages, 
including San Francisco, Lockyer v. San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 465 (Cal. 2004), 
New Paltz, New York, Kathianne Boniello, Ulster Wins Appeal to Prosecute Over Gay 
Vows, POUGHKEEPSIE JOURNAL, Feb. 3, 2005, at 1, and Multinomah County, Oregon, 
8
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the state constitution must allow gay marriage.18  We have come to a 
point in which struggles over same-sex marriage have transcended 
straightforward controversies over the meaning of marriage 
statutes, to become full-blown cultural wars.19 
In the 1970s, gay petitioners in a case such as Baker v. Nelson20 
could essentially slip in under radar with the argument that a local 
marriage statute simply failed to specify gender and might 
consequently be expanded to include same-sex couples.21  But with 
the national and local defense of marriage acts (DOMA)22 and 
threats of amending constitutions to prohibit gay marriage,23 that 
kind of sleight of hand would today seem disingenuous.  Gay 
marriage at the turn of the 21st century is an explicitly political, 
constitutional, and national issue. 
While this essay does not deal directly with the legal and 
cultural issues surrounding same-sex marriage, in recent LGBT 
family cases the fear of legalized gay marriage is a clear, if 
unspoken, subtext—a subtext that makes itself visible through 
increasingly restrictive “legal” (what I dub “lex”), factual, and 
methodological analyses.  When we try to unpack the various 
factors affecting these LGBT family law cases, then, we must keep 
in mind the cultural climate; the impact of fears about the “threat” 
of gay marriage may be so powerful that it can be felt in statutory 
 
Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005). 
 18. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 19. In his dissent to Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia frets at length that the 
Supreme Court’s abolition of consensual sodomy laws will lead inevitably to the 
sanctioning of gay marriage, and that in so doing, “the Court has taken sides in 
the culture war.”  539 U.S. 558, 602, 604-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 20. 191 N.W.2d 185, 291 Minn. 310 (1971). 
 21. Id. at 185, 291 Minn. at 311.  Not that this litigation strategy was 
successful.  The Minnesota trial court and Supreme Court determined that the 
term “marriage” meant, and would have meant to the drafters of the state’s 
marriage statute, “the state of union between persons of the opposite sex.”  Id. at 
186, 291 Minn. at 311. 
 22. The Federal Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (declaring that for the 
federal government the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a 
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife) was enacted in 1996.  On its 
heels dozens of states have proposed, considered, enacted, and in some instances 
repealed their own versions.  For an up-to-date survey of the fast-changing array of 
DOMA legislation and litigation, see Robin Cheryl Miller & Jason Binimow, 
Annotation, Marriage Between Persons of Same Sex—United States and Canadian Cases, 
1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2005). 
 23. A recent threat to amend the U.S. Constitution included language 
specifying that marriage “shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.”  
S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003). 
9
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analyses of LGBT family cases that on their face have no direct 
relationship to the legality of same-sex marriage.24 
That caveat aside, I here engage in an analysis of queer family 
law decisions that takes seriously the ways in which courts approach 
LGBT families.  I will be focusing on the analytical frameworks 
courts construct in order to make sense of the people whose lives 
they are considering and to whom they are granting or withholding 
legitimacy.  Each section of this essay corresponds to each of the 
strands of reasoning that I have explicated above—analysis of lex, 
fact, and method.  At the end of this Article I discuss the ways in 
which the three work in relation to one another, and show how all 
may be woven together into what I term the authoritative moment, 
which may encapsulate, or even determine, the holding in a 
judicial opinion. 
II. LEX REASONING IN QUEER FAMILY LAW CASES 
One of the first things we teach beginning lawyers is that the 
primary duty of the courts is to decide how the rules of law, as set 
forth in statutes and interpreted in the common law, apply to the 
facts of a given case.25  Without taking seriously this body of 
controlling authority, courts might have unfettered discretion to 
render potentially capricious decisions.  The very fact that the 
ambiguous (and reductive) term “judicial activism” is available as a 
universal pejorative for any judicial action that is seen to exceed the 
courts’ authority or interpretive mandate26 suggests how strongly we 
 
 24. Courts’ concerns that they may be criticized as overreaching in 
recognizing queer families, or fear that they may inadvertently establish precedent 
for gay marriage in their own jurisdictions, seems to affect their decisions in a wide 
array of cases which do not, on their face, address the issue.  See, e.g., In re 
Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (overruling a trial court 
order refusing to allow a woman to change her last name to that of her lesbian 
partner, on the grounds that it would create an impression that the two were 
married). 
 25. Though perhaps simplistic, this basic description is the ubiquitous 
foundation for more sophisticated considerations of legal reasoning.  See, e.g., 
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM ET AL., LAWYERING BY THE BOOK 17-67 (2004) (self-
published text of the NYU Lawyering Program); BERCH ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL METHOD AND PROCESS (3d ed. 2002); JANE C. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 2-3 (2d ed. 2003); CATHY GLASER ET AL., THE LAWYER’S CRAFT: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANALYSIS, WRITING, RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY 9-12 
(2002); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: 
STRUCTURE, STRATEGY AND STYLE 15-22 (2d ed. 1994). 
 26. As Judge Frank Easterbrook recently commented, “Everyone scorns 
judicial ‘activism,’ that notoriously slippery term.”  Frank H. Easterbrook, Do 
10
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view the courts’ obligations to rule within the bounds of already 
established law. 
So to take seriously the various modes of “thinking” required 
by courts in determining whether the LGBT families before them 
constitute a family, the only fair place to start is with a 
consideration of the relevant bodies of law guiding each court.  
Courts themselves struggle mightily to find direction from extant 
law even in cases which undeniably present questions of first 
impression.  LGBT family cases so often require courts to 
categorize unfamiliar family structures that they can feel as if they 
present entirely novel legal questions.  But family law schemes are 
generally meant to be flexible, fact-bound, and ultimately 
pragmatic, so as to respond to the lived experiences of the personal 
lives with which they engage.  When deciding how to understand a 
new family status such as a same-sex “civil union” then, the 
limitations of “lex” guidance can place great strains upon the 
courts. 
After the State of Vermont enacted its historic law permitting 
same-sex partners—even those who did not reside in the state—to 
enter into legally-recognized civil unions, the burden necessarily 
fell on other states to decide under their own laws the legal 
significance of such unions.  Civilly united same-sex couples 
pressed for their status to be recognized by other states on a variety 
of fronts.  Given the lack of historical precedent for this newly-
constructed legal status, it is not surprising that most states have 
little direct statutory or common law assistance in deciding what to 
do with same-sex unions created in other jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, courts examining the status of gay marriages and 
civil unions nearly universally strive to find “lex” guidance to 
resolve the question of how to understand this purported legal 
relationship.  In Burns v. Burns,27 for example, the Georgia Court of 
Appeals was asked to consider the situation of a divorced woman 
whose child custody consent decree required that during visitation, 
neither of the former spouses entertain overnight guests to whom 
they were not married.28  Mr. Burns contended that Ms. Burns 
 
Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1401 
(2001); see also Leslie R. Weatherhead, Letting Judges Judge: The Myth of “Judicial 
Activism,” 59 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9, 9 (1999) (“Permeating all of these debates is an 
oft-repeated disdain for ‘activist’ judges.”). 
 27. 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). 
 28. Id. at 48. 
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violated that court order by having her children reside overnight in 
the home she shared with her female partner.29  Ms. Burns 
countered by arguing, in effect, that the couple’s civil union 
satisfied the requirements of the visitation order because it was 
essentially akin to a state of marriage.30  Civil unions are quite 
recent,31 so it was unlikely that the Georgia courts would find 
unequivocal guidance in established sources of its state law (either 
common law or statutory32) to aid their conception of this civil 
union status.  As a first line of analysis, however, the Georgia court 
nonetheless strove to find some guidance in some well-settled lex. 
The court located an easy answer to the controversy in the 
Vermont statute itself.33  As the court of appeals noted, in creating 
the new category of “civil union” the Vermont lawmakers carefully 
distinguished that state from “marriage,” that is, “the legally 
recognized union of one man and one woman.”34  Moreover, the 
Vermont legislators indicated that they offered civil unions only to 
same-gender couples who were “therefore excluded from the 
marriage laws of this state.”35  It was thus a rather straightforward 
matter for the court to conclude that Ms. Burns was not actually 
married, in Vermont or any other state.  Consequently, in keeping 
both her partner and her children overnight, she had violated the 
terms of the Georgia court order.36  The Burns opinion went on to 
consider the status of the same-sex relationship if Vermont had 
purported to create a gay marriage,37 but this dicta is anticlimactic; 
as the court explains it the purpose of the civil union statutes is 
clear, the language of the custody decree is unequivocal, and the 
decision feels easily foreordained by the governing law.  Such cases 
provide little room or reason for courts to engage in complicated 
examination of legal policy. 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. The Vermont civil union statutes, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 
(2004), were passed on July 1, 2000. 
 32. The story is not quite as simple as I make it, however, since arguably there 
was statutory guidance in Georgia in the form of its state DOMA.  GA. CODE ANN. § 
19-3-3.1 (2004).  But perhaps because the constitutional status of that law 
remained unclear, the thrust of the Burns court’s opinion rests on its analysis of 
the Vermont Act. 
 33. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201. 
 34. Id. § 1201(4) (quoted in Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48). 
 35. Id. § 1202(2) (2005). 
 36. Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 49. 
 37. Id. 
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In fact, as is their obligation, courts will hew closely to their 
understanding of binding legal authority even when it leads to 
results with which they are unsatisfied.  The Connecticut Superior 
Court in Lane v. Albanese, for example, seemed decidedly displeased 
with its own conclusion that Connecticut courts had no jurisdiction 
to annul a same-sex marriage entered in Massachusetts.38  Prior to 
Lane, however, the Connecticut Appellate Court had concluded 
that Connecticut had no jurisdiction under its domestic relations 
law to dissolve a same-sex couple’s Vermont civil union.39  The Lane 
court relied upon the prior opinion’s assertion that the 
acknowledgment by legal dissolution of gay relationships was a 
matter of public policy best left for the legislatures,40 and that the 
Connecticut General Statutes provided that “‘the current public 
policy of the State of Connecticut is now limited to a marriage 
between a man and a woman.’”41  This explicit legislative act, 
coupled with the clear precedent established in Rosengarten, led the 
Lane court inexorably to determine that it lacked jurisdiction to 
dissolve a same-sex marriage.42  Yet the court’s language in its 
 
 38. See No. FA044002128S, 2005 WL 896129 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 
2005).  This decision is unpublished, but is readily available on Westlaw.  I have 
gathered and used several unpublished decisions for this research because their 
presumed unavailability as precedent does not alter my analysis of their content.  
Though perhaps it should.  At least one respected jurist has suggested that 
unpublished opinions may not be as precisely reasoned, or as carefully drafted, as 
those intended for publication.  Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t 
Cite This!: Why We Don’t Allow Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW. 43, 43-44 
(2000). 
  Yet others contend that unpublished opinions may be a backhanded way 
of addressing controversial issues without raising a fuss.  Suzanne O. Snowden, 
Note, “That’s My Holding and I’m Not Sticking to it!”: Court Rules that Deprive 
Unpublished Opinions of Precedential Authority Distort the Common Law, 79 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1253, 1256 (2001).  If true, this could mean that cases dealing with LGBT 
rights are particularly susceptible to being decided in unpublished opinions.  In 
any case, commentators are increasingly questioning whether unpublished 
opinions ought to remain uncitable, and some even suggest that the current 
practice of issuing non-precedential opinions is unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Jon A. 
Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the Firth Amendment: 
Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value is Unconstitutional, 50 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 195, 211-223 (2001). 
 39. Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 184 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). 
 40. Lane, 2005 WL 896129, at *3. 
 41. Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-727a(4) (2004)). 
 42. Id. at *4.  The court did go on to discuss a further basis for denying 
jurisdiction, which was the questionable legitimacy of the marriage even under 
Massachusetts law.  Massachusetts statutes prohibit marriages to non-residents if 
the marriage would not be legal in the participants’ home state.  MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 207, § 11 (2004).  Since Connecticut law and public policy made it likely that 
13
Franklin: The "Authoritative Moment": Exploring the Boundaries of Interpret
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
07FRANKLIN.DOC 1/20/2006  4:17:31 PM 
668 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
concluding comment seems to inject a note of regret: “Unless and 
until our legislature enacts legislation that reflects a public policy 
favoring recognition of civil unions or marriage between same-sex 
couples, this court has no choice but to dismiss this case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.”43 
It seems apparent, and not especially surprising, then, that in 
defining (or not defining) LGBT families, courts will try to follow 
what they conceive to be binding law regardless of their ideas on 
the matters before them.  But this is no easy task.  In a society that 
only in 2003 overturned laws criminalizing homosexual sex,44 the 
advent of the open and celebratory queer family seeking legal 
consideration is a relatively recent phenomenon.  It stands to 
reason that most legislatures drafting, and courts interpreting, 
statutes related to marriage, divorce, adoption, custody and other 
intimate familial topics did not consider the possibility of the queer 
family.  As the New York Supreme Court observed when deciding 
in Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital45 whether a surviving same-sex 
partner whose relationship had been solemnized in a Vermont civil 
union qualified as a “spouse” for the purpose of bringing a 
wrongful death claim on behalf of his deceased partner, “[t]he 
court acknowledges that at the time the wrongful death statutes 
were written, the use of the term spouse did not envision inclusion 
of a same-sex marital partner.”46 
Given this absence of direction as to how to treat these newly-
emerging families, the courts must find some way of “filling in” the 
law on point.  Even as they try most meticulously to seek direction 
from mandatory authority, the comparative newness of these family 
forms gives courts wide discretion in determining which theories 
and analogies most closely hew to the jurisdiction’s established 
policies and “lex.”  Consequently, even when they strive to adhere 
closely to statutory language and established precedent, different 
courts can come to quite different conclusions. 
 
the same-sex marriage would not be legally recognized in Connecticut, it may, 
under Massachusetts law, have been null at the outset.  See Lane, 2005 WL 896129, 
at *4. 
 43. Lane, 2005 WL 896129, at *4. 
 44. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 45. 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).  Since the writing of this article was 
completed, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, reversed Langan.  
802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).  The reversal was handed down too late 
for analysis of it to be included in this Article before publication. 
 46. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 420. 
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Some of the divergences we find in these cases must be 
attributed to significant variations in each jurisdiction’s body of law.  
Every state that has enacted a defense of marriage act,47 for 
example, will necessarily look at gay relationships differently from 
states that have not done so.48  Additionally, states having public 
policies favoring the legitimatization of same-sex unions will have 
quite yet another set of potential directions.  In asking whether it 
has jurisdiction to dissolve a same-sex union entered into in 
Vermont, for example, the Massachusetts Superior Court in Salucco 
v. Alldredge agreed with the Connecticut analysis that a civil union is 
not a marriage, and that consequently the state’s divorce statutes 
were inapplicable.49  But Massachusetts is the state that brought us 
same-sex marriage in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.50  Thus 
the Salucco court did not end its work with its conclusion that 
divorce statutes were inapplicable.51  Instead it found that Goodridge 
offered binding precedent establishing that Massachusetts law and 
policy require that same-sex couples be afforded the same legal 
protections as opposite-sex couples.52  Thus the court determined 
that its general equity jurisdiction entitles it to fashion a remedy for 
the dissolution of a civil union.53 
There is certainly no other jurisdiction besides Massachusetts 
that currently has the precedent of gay marriage to guide its 
consideration of civil unions.  But does that make it similarly true 
that no other state can find a way lawfully to recognize civil union 
status?  Even without the assistance of Goodridge, the New York court 
in Langan did not believe itself so constrained.  Acknowledging that 
“the concepts of marriage evolve over time,” and that “public 
 
 47. As of August 31, 2005, at least thirty-nine states had DOMAs, 
constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, or both.  For a map 
illustrating the status of anti-gay family measures in the various states, see National 
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Anti-Gay Marriage Measures in the U.S. (2005) 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 
2005). 
 48. In fact, had the Burns analysis not rested comfortably on the question of 
whether a civil union was a marriage, the court would likely have found Georgia’s 
DOMA dispositive.  See Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) 
(commenting that recognizing foreign same-sex marriages would violate GA. CODE 
ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004)). 
 49. Salucco v. Alldredge, No. 02E0087GC1, 2004 WL 864459 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 19, 2004). 
 50. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 51. Salucco, 2004 WL 864459, at *3-4. 
 52. Id. at *4. 
 53. Id. at *4-5. 
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opinion regarding same-sex unions” was undergoing a similar 
change,54 the court concluded that Langan was his deceased 
partner’s spouse for the purpose of the state’s wrongful death 
statutes.55  Although it remarked that a court must be “certain of its 
ground”56 before categorically changing the meaning of a statute 
(here, section 10 of the New York Domestic Relations Law, defining 
marriage), the Langan court examined the purposes, privileges and 
function of civil unions and determined that “[t]he civil union is 
indistinguishable for societal purposes from the nuclear family and 
marriage.”57 
The differing decisions about the legal status of foreign civil 
unions in Massachusetts and Connecticut seem nearly 
predetermined by Massachusetts’ gay marriage rulings.  But what 
accounts for the divergence between Connecticut and New York? 
It could be argued that the New York case is predicated on the 
uniqueness of the state’s holding in Braschi that gay partners may 
be considered family members for the purpose of succession in 
rent-controlled apartments.58  And the Langan opinion does 
liberally reference Braschi.59  But the Langan court appears far more 
directly bound by Raum v. Restaurant Associates, in which the New 
York Appellate Division held that despite Braschi, a same-sex 
partner did not qualify as a spouse for the purpose of New York 
wrongful death law.60  Nonetheless, the court determined that there 
was no mandatory authority addressing the rights of civilly united 
partners under the wrongful death statutes, and found compelling 
reasons why they ought to be included.61  It hardly seems, then, that 
New York precedent required the Langan finding.  Rather the 
opposite—it was only by carefully distinguishing the legal status of 
same-sex marriages in Massachusetts from same-sex unions in 
Vermont that the New York Supreme Court escaped the conclusion 
that its own precedents required a contrary result. 
Unless we conclude that either Langan or Lane is actually 
 
 54. Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 420 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003), 
rev’d, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
 55. Id. at 422. 
 56. Id. at 421 (quoting In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir 
1980)). 
 57. Id.; see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1999) (defining marriage). 
 58. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989). 
 59. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16. 
 60. Raum v. Rest. Assoc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
 61. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21. 
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categorically wrong,62 then, these cases help illustrate that courts 
have wide latitude in deciding how to envision the queer families 
that have not previously been imagined by legislators and judges.  
Something beyond the narrow dictates of direct legal authority 
influences, and perhaps in some instances underlies, their 
determinations.  The remainder of this Article seeks to theorize 
about what that “something” might be. 
Before moving past the topic of “lex” reasoning, however, it is 
important to reflect that the authority the courts are grappling with 
in LGBT family cases can be either direct statutory instruction, or 
common law interpretation, or more often, both.  There are 
certainly important differences in the ways these disparate legal 
sources operate and in their level of authority over judicial action.  
In fact, this is an understatement.  There is a wealth of scholarship 
devoted to discussing the way that courts should interpret statutes,63 
and though there is a wide array of opinions about how much 
discretion judges have in statutory interpretation,64 there is little 
question that unless unconstitutional, legislative acts carry greater 
weight than judicial interpretations. 
Even leaving aside the inherent differences among the states’ 
 
 62. As indicated supra in note 45, the Appellate Division has decided just that: 
Langan, according to the majority, was categorically wrong.  802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005). 
 63. A search of law reviews and academic journals in the Westlaw database 
shows almost 300 articles with “statutory interpretation” in the title.  Amazon.com 
lists more than 100 books with the words “statutory interpretation” in the title.  
The Library of Congress catalog lists 9976 entries under the keywords “statutory 
interpretation.” 
 64. It may be a gross oversimplification of a vast intellectual field, but scholars 
of judicial interpretation of legislative acts have been divided roughly into two 
camps: “textualists,” such as Justice Antonin Scalia, and proponents of “dynamic 
interpretation,” such as William Eskridge.  Both groups may be hard to define, and 
the borders between them can be amorphous.  In general, though, textualism can 
be thought of as urging judges to follow the commonly understood meaning of 
enacted texts, rather than searching for the intent of the drafters or for any other 
interpretive realm beyond the words on the page.  See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3-47 (1997).  “Dynamic 
interpretation,” conversely, assumes that legislation must be assumed to be 
multilayered, culturally-specific, and evolving over time.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48-60 (1994). 
  One debate between these poles centers around the question of whether, 
in the absence of explicit legislative direction, courts may, or may not, do 
substantive reading of the law.  This Article need not wade deeply into that 
discussion because my point sidesteps it; I contend that in the uncharted waters of 
queer family law definition, at least, whichever side the courts choose requires a 
“substantive” determination. 
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collective bodies of family law, then, the different prominence and 
methods usually afforded the interpretation of statutes and 
common law (“plain meaning” and cannons of construction vs. 
comparison and distinction of material facts and reasoning) might 
suggest that it may not be possible to meaningfully compare 
judicial opinions interpreting or relying on differing sources of 
authority.65  And in the most basic way, it is not.  It would certainly 
be unhelpful to try to draw absolute conclusions by placing 
decisions based on such disparate sources next to one another. 
But when courts are addressing the novel questions of law with 
profound cultural implications, and their extant body of law does 
not give direct guidance (which it rarely does in these first 
impression cases of family definition), their choices of what topics 
to consider or which legal concerns to bring to the forefront are 
particularly significant.  Regardless of whether the court grounds its 
analysis in divorce statutes or common law definitions of “spousal” 
relationships, a court seeking to decide whether it can act on a 
same-sex civil union must grapple with the relationship between 
civil union and marriage, as well as meaning and significance of a 
non-marriage adult affiliation.  The convergence of many of the 
central inquiries in these cases makes their frequent contrasts 
telling.  At the very least, these comparisons are fascinating, even if 
not analytically definitive. 
I start, then, with the premise that most courts, most of the 
time, strive mightily to apply the laws of their jurisdictions as they 
understand them.  But LGBT family definition cases can rarely be 
resolved only by referencing direct authority.  Where existing 
statutory definitions of family do not bind the courts, and they 
cannot glean legislative intent requiring a particular definition of 
family for the purpose at bar, there exists a wide sea of interpretive 
 
 65. Though in a surprising number of instances such differences may be less 
significant than the categorical boundaries between common law and statutory 
interpretation may suggest.  The same operative question may often be at issue for 
courts grappling with statutes as for those applying common law.  When dealing 
with custody and visitation for children, for example, almost all states apply the 
“best interest of the child” standard.  But the origins and meaning of that standard 
may be derived either from statutory or common law, or in many instances, both.  
That is, in some states the standard was introduced through common law, and in 
others, adopted by legislatures.  In either case, moreover, the accumulation of case 
law commenting on the meaning of the “best interest” standard has significantly 
shaped and perhaps clarified the term.  Despite these disparate and possibly 
multiple sources, however, each state purports to consider the same general 
question: What best serves the child’s welfare? 
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opportunity.  Amid such leeway the court may construe its mandate 
broadly (or practically), so as to include a new queer family within 
its collection of human relationships of which the law must be 
aware.  Or it may restrain itself from entering the fray, thus 
rendering the relationships before it purely informal and without 
legal weight.  If the extant enactments, regulations and judicial 
determinations fail to tell the courts which choice is preferable, 
they will have to stretch beyond pure “lex” if they are to decide 
what to do with the queer litigants before them. 
Once courts are reaching into the realms of uncertain 
interpretation, their work cannot consist solely of applying generic 
legal rules.  Instead, the court’s understanding of “law” (in the 
“lex” sense of the word) becomes commingled with its 
interpretation of the facts of the case before it. 
III.   FRAMING THE ISSUES: FACTUAL REASONING 
When a court cannot find precedent resolving a given 
controversy, or at least no precedent that seems precisely on point, 
it must attempt to compare the case before it with something 
already familiar.  If the direction offered by prior jurisprudence is 
minimal, as it often is in LGBT family-recognition cases, courts 
frequently find themselves looking for comparable family 
structures in order to make sense of what they are seeing.  Their 
intention is to work out whether the family form before them can 
map comparatively neatly onto pre-existing shapes or categories.  If 
that is not possible, then they must decide whether to analogize the 
new facts before them to older ones that they already understand. 
How they frame these facts—as a somewhat novel but patently 
recognizable nuclear family, as a radical change to everything we 
know and understand about the basic social unit or as something in 
between—will dramatically shape the court’s legal analysis.  As 
linguists such as George Lakoff suggest, differences in the way we 
frame ideas—that is, the way we describe them to ourselves and 
others—have real and discernable consequences.66  Rather than 
being merely semantic variations, differences in framing can 
connect to archetypal (and consequently comprehensible) 
 
 66. See GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! 3-34 (2004).  Indeed, 
Lakoff suggests that the way issues are framed can sway, and even determine, 
national elections.  See id. (suggesting that in the 2004 elections conservatives were 
successful in adopting metaphors that resonated with national values). 
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metaphors, or can simply wash over us without resonance.67  Simply 
stated, “metaphorical thought is unavoidable, ubiquitous, and 
mostly unconscious,” but nonetheless “we live our lives on the basis 
of inferences we derive via metaphor.”68  So in order to understand 
one part of courts’ work in reasoning through LGBT family law 
cases, we must look closely at the way they conceive of gay families, 
particularly to how closely or distantly they imagine those families 
to match the traditional norms. 
A. Thinking By Analogy—The Power of Categories 
We can see this process of matching the unfamiliar with the 
familiar in cases addressing marriages in which one of the partners 
is transsexual.  Despite having been certified through state-issued 
marriage licenses, marriages between transgendered persons and 
their now-opposite sex husbands and wives can nonetheless be 
subject to collateral attack. 
The decisions in these cases are often constructed around a 
simple categorization question; what is the legal gender of the 
transsexual partner?  The cases present a straightforward 
dichotomy—either the court accepts the transsexual partner as the 
sex he or she identifies with, or it does not.69  In theory, official 
 
 67. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson make the point that metaphors are 
conceptual, not merely linguistic.  That is, they embody ideas that may be 
culturally-specific, but are so widely held that they shape our very thoughts.  
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 3-6, 245-46 (2d ed. 
2003). 
  Lakoff and Johnson are but two of many linguists, literary theorists, 
psychologists, philosophers and other scholars who have examined the 
importance of metaphor in human understanding.  For a foundational 
examination of the centrality of metaphor in abstract thinking, see PAUL RICOEUR, 
THE RULE OF METAPHOR: MULTIDISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF THE CREATION OF MEANING 
IN LANGUAGE (Robert Czerny trans., 1975).  For groundbreaking work on the 
importance of metaphor in law, see the writings of Steven L. Winter.  See, e.g. 
STEPHEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001); 
Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988). 
 68. LAKOFF AND JOHNSON, supra note 67, at 272-73. 
 69. Although the resolution of this question is hardly an easy one, and courts 
often struggle mightily with the significance of their decisions.  In fact, courts may 
find the gender complexities these cases present to be so complicated that they 
make logical rhetorical moves inconsistent with their basic findings.  For example, 
it seems to be increasingly common for courts finding no gender change to 
nonetheless refer to transsexuals by their preferred (that is, new) pronouns.  See, 
e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. App. 1999) (“Throughout this 
opinion [plaintiff] will be referred to as ‘She.’  This is for grammatical simplicity’s 
20
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records should make this fairly easy.  In many of these cases, the 
trans70 spouse has changed her or his name, been issued new 
identifying documents (driver’s license, social security number, 
etc.), and has had her or his birth certificate altered to reflect the 
new gender.  If courts accept these documents as accurately 
representing the person identified within them, then the 
relationship they see is a heterosexual marriage whose difference 
from the norm is isotopic.  That is to say, the basic substance is the 
same, but the marriage may have somewhat different physical 
properties.  If not, then the relationship in question will be 
elementally different, and probably not cognizable. 
An early case dealing with a marriage between a transsexual 
woman and her biologically male husband illustrates the easy way 
in which a court may view a sex change operation as constituting a 
complete change in legal gender.71  The plaintiff, M.T., applied in 
New Jersey family court in 1975 for support and maintenance from 
her soon-to-be-ex husband, J.T.72  The husband claimed that he was 
not obliged to pay, because M.T. was transsexual and therefore not 
a woman, making their marriage void.73  M.T. had identified as 
female since her early teens, and in 1971 underwent gender-
 
sake, and out of respect for the litigant. . . .  It has no legal implications.”); see also 
In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 307 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (noting its 
first pronoun reference to petitioner to explain that the court uses “He” out of 
“respect for petitioner,” but that the term is not legally significant). 
 70. The appropriate nomenclature for those whose gender identity does not 
correspond with their biological sex at birth is a complicated one.  Medical 
literature and most court decisions generally use the term “transsexual” to refer to 
those who have begun or completed sex reassignment.  But the term is sometimes 
spelled “transexual,” which can be a simple spelling variant, or can be intended to 
distance the word from the psychological and medical connotations that the 
former spelling may have.  NATIONMASTER.COM, TRANSSEXUAL, 
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Transsexual (last visited Dec. 27, 
2005).  Others use the term “transgender,” which was introduced and adopted for 
a variety of reasons, including the notion that gender may be complex, and that 
transgender-identified people may, or may not, identify solely with one biological 
sex.  WIKIPEDIA, TRANSGENDER, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transgender (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2005).  Because none of these terms has been fully accepted, and 
all are deemed to have some conceptual problems, the umbrella term “trans” has 
been introduced, and adopted most often by activists.  Id. 
  This Article uses the more current term “trans” interchangeably with the 
other descriptors used by the various courts and litigants to describe those seeking 
to have their changes of gender legally recognized. 
 71. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 208-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
 72. Id. at 205. 
 73. Id. 
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reassignment surgery.74  In 1972 she and the defendant, a man with 
whom she had lived since the mid-1960s (before M.T.’s surgery) 
married in the State of New York before moving to live in New 
Jersey.75 
The family court’s opinion examined at length the actual 
surgery M.T. underwent, and recited expert opinion on the 
psychological and social ramifications of transgender identity.76  
The court used its review of M.T.’s medical procedures to 
determine whether she was male or female, since, “we accept—and 
it is not disputed—as the fundamental premise in this case that a 
lawful marriage requires the performance of a ceremonial marriage 
of two persons of the opposite sex, a male and a female.”77 
As the court observed, in the early 1970s there was very little 
case law concerning transgendered people.78  Thus, the court 
looked to a British case from 1970 as the closest analogue.79  But 
the New Jersey court came to a conclusion different from the 
British one, which held that a person “cannot ‘affect her true 
sex.’”80  The New Jersey court concluded that M.T. was doing 
everything in her power to present herself as, live as, and be a 
woman.81  Ultimately, therefore, the court held that if M.T. was “by 
virtue of medical treatment, thereby possessed of the full capacity 
to function sexually as a male or female . . . , we perceive no legal 
barrier, cognizable social taboo, or reason grounded in public 
policy to prevent that person’s identification at least for purposes of 
marriage to the sex finally indicated.”82  M.T. was a woman, hence 
her marriage was valid and she was entitled to maintenance and 
support.83 
If, on the other hand, a court does not accept that one can 
change sex or gender categories regardless of how one lives, what 
one is called, or how much documentation one has, then 
heterosexual marriage and the union between a biological man 
and transsexual woman (or vice versa) cannot be understood as a 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 205-07. 
 77. Id. at 207. 
 78. Id. at 208. 
 79. Id. (analyzing Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306 (P.). 
 80. Id. at 209 (quoting Corbett, 2 W.L.R. at 1323). 
 81. Id. at 211. 
 82. Id. at 210-11. 
 83. Id. at 211. 
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normative marriage.  It is of a different substance altogether.  
Courts reaching such a conclusion refuse the validity of this 
marriage, often claiming that what they are really looking at is a 
form of same-sex marriage. 
Thus in Estate of Gardiner, the son of Marshall Gardiner, who 
died intestate, challenged the right of his father’s wife, a post-
operative transsexual woman, to inherit Gardiner’s estate.84  The 
son claimed that J’Noel Gardiner was not legally a woman and that 
her marriage was invalid.85  J’Noel Gardiner previously underwent 
sex reassignment and was issued an amended birth certificate in 
Wisconsin; she and Marshall Gardiner met and married in Kansas, 
where he died a year later.86  Declining to recognize in the State of 
Kansas any change in J’Noel’s legal gender, the court granted the 
son’s petition.87  The court held that the plain meaning of the 
Kansas marriage statutes and defense of marriage act was that a 
marriage was valid only between two people who were of the 
opposite sex at birth.88  The court stated unambiguously that “the 
words ‘sex,’ ‘male,’ and ‘female’ in everyday understanding do not 
encompass transsexuals.  . . . A male-to-female post-operative 
transsexual does not fit the definition of a female.”89 
These two cases raise an important question:  How does the 
court know either that a formerly male litigant “should be 
considered a member of the female sex for marital purposes”90 or 
that she “does not fit the common meaning of female”?91  Despite 
the fact that the cases turn on such a determination, the answer to 
the question can be surprisingly opaque. 
In In re Nash, an Ohio court of appeals refused the application 
for a marriage license between a biological woman and a post-
operative transsexual man.92  Jacob Benjamin Nash, born Pamela 
 
 84. 42 P.3d 120, 121 (Kan. 2002). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 123. 
 87. Id. at 121. 
 88. Id. at 126.  In fact, though, that is not precisely what the statute says.  It 
reads, “[t]he marriage contract is to be considered in law as a civil contract 
between two parties who are of opposite sex.  All other marriages are declared to 
be contrary to the public policy of this state and are void.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-
101 (2001). 
 89. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135. 
 90. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
 91. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135. 
 92. Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 
31, 2003). 
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Ann Nash, had amended his Massachusetts birth certificate to 
include a change of his name, and to alter his designated gender 
from female to male.93  But the Ohio court refused to accept the 
validity of the revised birth certificate and determined that Nash 
had not thereby legally changed his sex.94  Defining sex by 
reproductive function (quite different from the court in M.T. v. 
J.T., which defined sex by sexual function), the court held that the 
category “male” simply cannot include a female-to-male 
transsexual.95  If Nash cannot be male, then the marriage cannot be 
valid, and to validate it would be, as the court says “placing our 
‘stamp of state approval’ on an actual marriage that is directly 
contrary to Ohio’s public policy on same-sex marriages.”96 
But why can Nash not be male?  Certainly, one answer is that 
the court defined male as “the sex that has organs to produce 
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova,”97 which categorically excludes 
Nash.  But this begs a larger question—why is the ability to 
reproduce the operative definition in Nash, rather than the sexual 
function definition in M.T. v J.T.?  The Nash court provided no 
reasoning to explain that this definition is more convincing than 
any other; it simply laid out the definition as self-evident, and 
moved on from there.98  And the dissenting opinion in Nash, 
although sharply disputing the majority’s conclusion, applied 
 
 93. Id. at *1. 
 94. Id. at *7. 
 95. It’s no accident, given the era, that the primary nonreligious argument 
against gay marriage is not reproduction itself but the possibility of reproduction. 
 96. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6.  It seems more than coincidental that 
courts have become increasingly conservative on the issue of transsexual marriage, 
and have begun linking it to chromosomal sex rather than sexual performance.  
In many of these decisions, the threat of gay marriage looms large, and the courts 
are doing everything possible to defer even a hint that they approve of or want to 
make possible same-sex marriage.  If there is the slightest doubt that a transsexual 
person might be in any way the same sex as her/his partner, the courts reiterate 
the prohibitions against gay marriage and equate validating marriages of 
transsexual people to partners of the other sex and same-sex marriage, which must 
be prevented. 
 97. Id.  This reliance on reproduction to define gender echoes the increasing 
reliance foes of same-sex marriage have placed on the (at least theoretical) 
likelihood of reproduction in heterosexual unions as grounds for giving them 
different legal status from homosexual ones.  See, e.g., Peter Sprigg, Questions and 
Answers: What’s Wrong with Letting Same-Sex Couples “Marry?”, FAMILY RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IF03H01 (last visited Dec. 27, 2005) 
(explaining that the hypothetical possibility of reproduction makes heterosexual 
couples the only “structural type” that should be favored and protected, even if its 
members do not want, or cannot have, children biologically). 
 98. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *6. 
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analogous reasoning.99  The dissent concluded quite simply that 
Nash’s gender change was apparent.100  In its forthright appeal to 
common sense, it asserted without citation that taking Nash’s 
gender on faith is one of those issues that “[is] so obvious, and [the 
results of the case] so clearly wrong, that we must look back and, 
like Dr. Phil, wonder ‘What were they thinking?’”101 
The legal persuasiveness of Dr. Phil aside, what is so striking 
about both opinions in this case is the shared assumption of a 
transparent worldview requiring little support from other sources.  
For the Nash majority, sex equals reproductive capacity—that 
conclusion is self-evident and demands no further debate.  Yet for 
the dissent, such a way of imagining sex is “so clearly wrong,” and 
accepting Nash’s declaration of his gender is “so obvious,” that it 
equally speaks for itself.  While these questions of gender 
identification may seem knotty, both sides in this case comfortably 
assert that the answers are easily apparent, despite the fact that the 
court’s presumably thoughtful and carefully considered opinions 
wholly diverge on this point. 
The Texas Court of Appeals in Littleton v. Prange found itself 
similarly untroubled about a transsexual’s true gender.102  In this 
case Christie Littleton, a male-to-female transsexual, brought a 
wrongful death suit against Dr. Mark Prange, who had treated her 
husband before he died.103  Prange challenged Littleton’s right to 
sue, arguing that since she was transsexual her marriage could not 
be legally recognized.104  In asking whether Littleton had standing 
to sue for the loss of her husband the court laid out the legal issue 
plainly:  “[C]an a physician change the gender of a person with a 
scalpel, drugs and counseling . . . ?”105  The opinion opens with a 
statement that the case presents “the most basic of questions.  
When is a man a man, and when is a woman a woman?”106  So this 
 
 99. See id. at *10-12 (Christley, J., dissenting). 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. at *12. 
 102. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 103. Id. at 225. 
 104. Id. (challenging suit on a motion for summary judgment that surviving 
spouse’s status was not a proper wrongful death beneficiary). 
 105. Id. at 224.  The rest of the quote may presage the answer, however: “[O]r 
is a person’s gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?”  Id.  Even if the 
religious reference suggests no specific political or philosophical orientation, 
posing the question as one of human intervention versus divine plan does tend to 
give the latter the advantage. 
 106. Id. at 223. 
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court, too, was asking whether surgery can alter someone’s gender 
from male to female.  While the court did go into considerable 
detail in its decision, citing cases from around the country and 
around the world, its answer to this question is ultimately 
arrestingly simple: Christie just is a man, by dint of her 
chromosomes and her original birth certificate.107  (“Biologically a 
post-operative female transsexual is still male.”108)  In the 
concluding words of the opinion, “[t]here are some things we 
cannot will into being.  They just are.”109 
Such an assurance is nearly tautological.  And for those who 
would disagree, it is nearly impossible to respond to.  It 
encompasses an entire worldview about the immutability of gender.  
Yet the court’s confidence in its belief that “some things . . . just 
are” is not, as we have seen in Nash above, necessarily ideologically 
linked.  After all, both the majority and the dissent in that case 
argued from the self-evidence of their positions.  Both sides agree 
that one is either male or female and that someone has to be either 
one or the other.  They simply categorically disagree with one 
another about which group the applicant before them falls into. 
As there is a dearth of legal precedent on this issue, courts 
must determine for themselves what and who they are dealing with.  
Most importantly, though, despite the complexities and 
ambiguities of gender that people on all sides of these decisions 
seem to acknowledge, the court must make a clear and 
unambiguous determination attaching a certain gender to a 
person, because the categories the court must work with are 
absolute.110  But since the medical, social, and legal guidance for 
the courts seeking to determine the transsexual litigants’ gender 
are not seen as dispositive, these various courts have little room to 
support their positions, or even to reason carefully through them.  
Rather, to avoid an irresolvable quagmire, they must make a leap of 
 
 107. See id. at 224. 
 108. Id. at 230. 
 109. Id. at 231. 
 110. Or at least the courts assume so.  Feminists and gender activists might 
critique the assertion that the construction of gender is absolutely binary.  See, e.g., 
JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 
(1990).  However, courts do not seem willing to entertain any notion of murkiness 
or complexity in gender identity.  It is probably difficult enough for them to 
decide whether trans people are “male” or “female”; asking them to entertain the 
possibility that one could be consciously, let alone legally, “both” or “neither” is 
unrealistic, and may in any case not be legally advantageous for trans litigants. 
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intuition, or of faith.111 
The language of intuition, and even more so, of faith, makes 
an uncomfortable fit with legal analysis.  After all, discussions of 
legal decisions take for granted that courts’ determinations are 
entirely analytical and reasoned from precedent (or, alternatively, 
critics lambaste decisions as being inadequately reasoned).112  Cases 
dealing with transsexuals’ marriages tend not to operate that way, 
however.  Rather, the courts’ conclusions seem to issue from a flash 
of insight, a powerful belief about the way the world works and 
should work.  Certainly, the means by which courts generate these 
beliefs are not preordained.  This is not least because well-meaning 
courts faced with essentially the same question (that is to say, what 
gender is this person?) can occupy polar opposite positions.  More 
strikingly, so can judges sitting on the same court, analyzing the 
same statutes and precedents.  Neither side offers proof for its 
conclusion; on the contrary, statements like “some things . . . just 
are” defy legal authority, or, rather, stand as authorities, as 
statements of indisputable fact. 
Such a belief is not achieved by a process of methodical 
analysis.  It is achieved instantaneously—either you see it or you 
don’t.  But this is not to denigrate this mode of thinking.  As 
Malcolm Gladwell suggests, intuitive thinking—the leap of faith— 
may be as important, and in some instances, an even more reliable 
intellectual process than considerations arrived at more 
methodically or meticulously.113  At the same time, it is important 
that we identify this kind of thinking for what it is, and differentiate 
it from the reasoning processes by which we assume law usually 
 
 111. As St. Augustine succinctly describes it, “[f]aith therefore is to believe that 
which you do not see, truth is to see what you have believed.”  ST. AUGUSTINE, ON 
THE GOSPEL OF JOHN XL, at 9. 
 112. Take for an example the persistent critique of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 
(1973).  Though the debate over abortion may be one of politics or morals, the 
legal criticism of the Court’s opinion in Roe has been grounded in argument that 
the decision lacks legal foundation.  See, for but one example, ROBERT BORK, 
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 103 
(2003) (“Whatever one’s feelings about abortion, [Roe] has no constitutional 
foundation, and the Court offered no constitutional reasoning.”). 
 113. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 
13-14 (2005).  Gladwell asserts that even though “we are innately suspicious . . . of 
rapid cognition,” decisions reached intuitively and near-instantaneously “can be 
every bit as good as decisions made cautiously and deliberately.”  Id.  Some of 
Gladwell’s methods and broad conclusions have been critiqued, but the success of 
his work has put the idea of instantaneous decision-making in the public 
consciousness, and his notions resonate at least somewhat with most of his readers. 
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operates. 
Although these transsexual marriage cases are quite different 
from each other in terms of content (inheritance, the granting of a 
marriage license, standing in a wrongful death suit), they all share 
this leap of faith.  All demand statutory interpretation, and their 
core issue is the same; if marriage is legal only between people of 
opposite gender, is there a valid marriage on the facts at bar, or 
not?  If the court determines that the marriage contains two 
partners of different genders, then marital law kicks in and 
whatever rights and responsibilities accord to that law are in force.  
If the court decides instead that, whatever the state Vital Records 
Officers and the Division of Motor Vehicles say, the transsexual 
spouse is still the sex on his or her original birth certificate, then 
none of the rights and responsibilities of marriage can attach.114 
Ultimately, then, the courts represent the factual content of 
the cases as straightforward, and the decisions they came to as 
easy.115  What the courts do not make visible is the fact that the ease 
of the decision is linked directly to the power of the courts’ faith in 
determining gender.  If it is easy to work out whether someone is 
male or female—if that determination “just is”—then everything 
else follows. 
B. Thinking Laterally—Are Queer Families Like Straight Ones? 
While courts can apply a straightforward “is s/he or isn’t s/he” 
categorization to cases concerning transsexual people, many other 
types of LGBT family cases require more than a choice between two 
clear possibilities.  Instead, the cases ask judges to construct 
broader analogies between existing family forms and the queer 
families seeking legal acknowledgement. 
In the Florida case of Peterman v. Meeker,116 for example, a gay 
 
 114. Unless, of course, the State is willing to open the status of marriage to 
partners of the same gender.  It is not hard to imagine that the fear of opening the 
door for gay marriage may underlie the rigidity with which some of these courts 
determine gender.  In fact, the comparative ease with which the New Jersey court 
accepted M.T.’s gender change in 1975 might be connected to the fairly limited 
ramifications a court of that time could imagine such a decision having. 
 115. This is not to say that discovering the factual content is easy.  Littleton 
spends many pages poring over every possible precedential or related case before 
deciding on the actual facts of the case.  Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 
App. 1999).  But once it has determined how to determine sex, the work that sex 
does in these cases is the same. 
 116. 855 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
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man sought an injunction against his same-sex partner on the 
charge of domestic violence.  A couple for thirteen years, John 
Peterman and Nute Meeker’s relationship was dissolving, and 
Meeker sought an injunction against Peterman to protect himself 
from violence.117  Peterman’s attorney opposed the restraining 
order, contending that the Florida statutes concerning domestic 
violence applied only to heterosexual couples.118  In a remarkably 
brief and untroubled opinion the court dismissed Peterman’s 
claim.119  Pointing out that the domestic violence statute states 
explicitly that “[n]o person shall be precluded from seeking 
injunctive relief . . . solely on the basis that such a person is not a 
spouse,”120 the court held that the gender of the two partners had 
no relation to the applicability of the statute.121  The court observed 
that the case presented a wholly new issue for Florida, but that the 
analogy to similar cases in other states, and to unmarried 
heterosexual partners, was sufficiently compelling to convince the 
court that the statute should include same-sex partners.122 
But even if the analogies between unmarried hetero- and 
homosexual partners seem fairly direct in cases of domestic 
violence (one adult romantic partner is alleged to be harming 
another), when parenting relationships are involved it becomes 
significantly more complicated to frame queer family relationships 
as analogizable to commonly-understood straight ones.  The 
reasons why such an analogy can be harder to draw can be seen in 
what have become known as second-parent adoptions.  These are 
legal adoptions by a nonbiological parent of the biological child of 
his or her gay partner without the termination of parental rights of 
the birth parent, so that the child will have two legal parents of the 
same sex.123 
 
 117. Id. at 690. 
 118. Id. (arguing that FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (2002) does not protect homosexuals 
against domestic violence).  The statutes define family or household members as 
“spouses, former spouses, persons related by blood or marriage, persons who are 
presently residing together as if a family or who have resided together in the past 
as if a family, and persons who are parents of  a child in common regardless of 
whether they have been married.”  FLA. STAT. § 741.28(3) (2002). 
 119. Peterman, 855 So. 2d at 691. 
 120. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 741.30(1)(e)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Emily C. Patt, Second Parent Adoption: When Crossing the Marital Barrier is 
in a Child’s Best Interests, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 96, 98 (1987); Elizabeth 
Zuckerman, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families: Legal Recognition of 
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It is a basic fact of biology that two people of the same sex 
cannot produce a child together,124 and a legal fact that they can 
rarely adopt children jointly.125  If they do seek joint adoption, as 
genetic strangers to the child, a gay or lesbian couple will be 
biologically, and perhaps legally, on the same footing as a 
heterosexual couple.126  But where one partner in a gay couple is 
already a biological or adoptive parent of a child and the other 
seeks legal parenting status, the question becomes one that straight 
couples do not face; c+an the other intended parent be legally 
recognized without severing the legal rights of the first?  Adoption 
laws are predicated on the assumption that the new parents replace 
the old, whose parental rights are terminated.  The original 
(biological) mother is substituted with the new (adoptive) mother, 
and the same for the father, if known.  Obviously, an adoption 
cannot work quite the same way for two parents of the same 
gender.  So the couple must petition for a second-parent adoption, 
asking a court to declare that the child has a new mother or father, 
in addition to, rather than instead of, the existing one. 
Gay couples seeking second-parent adoptions imagine 
themselves as presenting a straightforward request.  They are 
simply asking that courts legally recognize the reality of two people, 
one legally related to the child and the other not, choosing to raise 
a child together.127  For the courts, however, the question can carry 
 
the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729, 733 (1986). 
 124. Of course, neither can some heterosexual couples.  In fact, much of the 
technology that queer parents use to conceive—assisted insemination, in vitro 
fertilization, surrogacy—was developed to help infertile heterosexual couples 
produce children.  Nonetheless, the importance and centrality of procreation is 
often given as a primary reason why the government can or should promote 
heterosexual marriage but prohibit legal marriages by persons of the same sex.  See 
Douglas W. Kmiec, The Procreative Argument for Proscribing Same-Sex Marriage, 32 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 653, 667-68 (2004). 
 125. Most states only allow joint adoptions to legally married couples.  Lynne 
Marie Kohm, Moral Realism and the Adoption of Children by Homosexuals, 38 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 643, 651 (2004) (though the author observes that some courts “circumvent 
this by interpreting ‘person’ in the statute as ‘persons’”). 
 126. Some jurisdictions or adoption agencies may have a preference for 
heterosexual couples over homosexual ones, and adoptions by gay people may be 
prohibited altogether.  Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 
F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).  But if joint adoption 
by two parents is allowed, then the status of both adoptive parents will be precisely 
equivalent. 
 127. Consequently, a great deal of resources for gay families are devoted to 
finding ways to legally recognize both biological and non-biological parents.  For a 
frequently-updated example of advice to such families, see Gay Parenting, 
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with it a dizzying array of ramifications.  Does caring for a child 
have the same status as being biologically related to that child?  
Does the state’s law permit a child legally to have two mothers or 
two fathers?  What does this say about the relationship status of the 
parents? 
In fact, in comparable heterosexual situations, that last 
question might be enormously important.  There is a longstanding 
assumption that parentage within heterosexual marriage is shared.  
One of the rights of marriage is that if a married woman delivers a 
child, the law generally takes for granted (in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary) that her husband is the child’s father and 
she is the child’s mother, even if that child is the result of donated 
eggs and/or sperm.128  And for similar reasons, in many states a 
stepparent can adopt her or his spouse’s child without displacing 
the parental rights of the child’s biological parent of the same 
sex.129 
With neither biology nor lawful marriage to easily determine 
the legal status of the legally non-recognized gay or lesbian parent’s 
connection to the child, courts face a more exacting task in second-
parent adoption cases than they do (or at least, than they imagine 
they do) in the trans marriage cases.  Now they must weigh a 
complex array of considerations including the intention of the 
 
http://www.gay.com/families/parenting/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2005).  Even the 
American Academy of Pediatrics has issued a report supporting the legalization of 
such ties, noting that second-parent adoption has “important psychologic and 
legal benefits.”  Ellen C. Perrin et. al., Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent 
Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341 (2002). 
 128. See LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 995 (2d ed. 2000) 
(“Today, all states, by statute or common law, provide that a married woman’s 
husband is at least rebuttably presumed to be the father of her children.”).  For a 
concise history of the marital presumption of paternity, see Katharine K. Baker, 
Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12-13 (2004). 
 129. In fact, if state statutory schemes or common law permit second-parent 
adoptions for unmarried heterosexual stepparents (and a few do), the problem of 
gay or lesbian non-biological parents will probably be resolved by “lex” extension, 
rather than broader analogy.  See In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001).  
That is, the position of the non-marital partner of one legal parent can be seen as 
a “third” parent whose rights may be recognized because of his/her relationship to 
the child, rather than any specific relationship with the child’s parent.  Id.  But few 
states offer stepparent adoptions to unmarried partners, so for the cases discussed 
here, the operative questions present the courts with more vexing issues, requiring 
more searching evaluations of the status of non-married gay partners.  For a 
general summary of state laws on stepparent adoption, see TIM O’HANLON, 
STEPPARENT ADOPTION: A RESOURCE BOOK (2004). 
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family to create a two-parent household, the lack of legislative 
provisions for formalizing the relationship between the two 
parents, the significance of any provisions allowing heterosexual 
stepparents to adopt children in their homes, and, always, what is 
in the best interests of the child[ren] in question.  They must reach 
to decide whether, even if statutes do not specifically provide for 
such a scenario, they can frame their understanding of same-sex 
parents so that their family relationships are analogizable to 
straight ones, and consequently legally recognizable. 
In re Adoption of M.M.G.C.130 is a typical second-parent adoption 
case, and operates as a clear model for the kinds of decisions courts 
can make if they are inclined to construct analogies in favor of 
queer families.  A lesbian couple, Shannon and Amber Crawford-
Taylor, petitioned the Indiana trial court to adopt jointly three 
children, two from Ethiopia, and one from China, whom Shannon 
had already adopted singly.131  The county’s Division of Family and 
Children Services endorsed all three adoptions, describing the 
family as “relaxed and comfortable.”132  The trial court, citing the 
state’s limitation of joint adoption to married couples and the 
Indiana DOMA, which states “[o]nly a female may marry a male. 
Only a male may marry a female,”133 denied the couple’s petition.134 
The Indiana Court of Appeals took a different approach.  The 
court immediately connected Amber’s status with that of a 
stepparent, and explicitly equated “second-parent adoption” with 
the adoption of a child by a stepparent.135  Since Indiana law 
allowed a stepparent to adopt a stepchild without terminating the 
parental rights of the biological parent of the same sex, the court 
reasoned that an analogous process could work for same-sex 
couples.136 
To the extent that the appellate court referred to statutes, it 
invoked the flexibility and humanity of statutory rule.  Since the 
right of adoption was “unknown at common law,” the purpose of 
Indiana adoption statutes, the court reasoned, has been to adjust to 
changing family forms—married couples, stepparents, and single 
 
 130. 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 131. Id. at 268. 
 132. Id. 
 133. IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (1998). 
 134. In re Adoption of M.M.G.C. 785 N.E.2d at 269. 
 135. Id. at 270. 
 136. Id. 
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people.137  Moreover, the overriding principle for adoption statutes 
has been the best interest of the child.138  Throughout its decision 
the court did not question that Shannon and Amber Crawford-
Taylor constitute a family, or that their joint legal parentage is in 
the best interest of their children.139  And in case it was not clear 
from its decision, the court ends its opinion by citing a series of 
cases that insist upon the mutability and social responsibility of 
both common and statutory law, as well as the need for the courts 
to work in concert with the legislature.140  Accordingly, despite the 
fact that the Indiana legislature had explicitly prohibited same-sex 
marriage,141 the M.M.G.C. court maintained: 
Consonant with our General Assembly’s policy of 
providing stable homes for children through adoption, we 
conclude that Indiana’s common law permits a second 
parent to adopt a child without divesting the rights of the 
first adoptive parent.  Allowing a second parent to share 
legal responsibility for the financial, spiritual, educational, 
and emotional well-being of the child in a stable, 
supportive, and nurturing environment can only be in the 
best interest of that child.142 
Unspoken but clear in this short and untortured decision is 
the ease of analogy between the lesbian parents in the case and 
their not-quite-equivalent heterosexual counterparts.  For the 
Indiana court, Shannon and Amber Crawford-Taylor are parents.  
Although their family might be different from the statistical norm it 
can be effectively analogized in order to fit into the statutory and 
common law requirements of Indiana adoption law.  The absence 
of marriage or mutual biological relationship with the child is, for 
the court, beside the point.  Amber’s relationship to her children is 
assumed to be like that of a married parent or stepparent, since it 
can be framed as similar, at least from the children’s perspective. 
However, just because the Indiana court found the analogy 
between lesbian co-parents and stepparents easy to make does not 
 
 137. Id. at 270. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 270-71 (citing Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 7 
(Ind. 1993); Sandy Ridge Oil Co. v. Centerre Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 510 N.E.2d 667, 
670 (Ind. 1987); Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972)). 
 141. In 1998 the Indiana State Legislature passed Indiana Code section 31-11-
1-1, entitled “Same Sex Marriage Prohibited.” 
 142. In re Adoption of M.M.G.C. 785 N.E.2d at 270-71. 
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mean that other courts, in other jurisdictions, find such an 
equation equally effortless.  In In re Adoption of Doe, for example, 
the Ohio Court of Appeals with equal ease came to precisely the 
opposite conclusion.143  The Doe court rejected the stepparent 
analogy, and by defining the biological mother’s partner as “an 
unmarried adult” rather than the equivalent of a spouse, 
concluded that her partner could not adopt their child without 
terminating the legal rights of the biological mother.144  The 
concurrence to the opinion invoked the limitation of marriage to 
heterosexuality and “the legal reality that two individuals of the 
same sex cannot marry under existing Ohio law and therefore 
cannot be spouses to each other,”145 but neither the opinion nor 
the concurrence took the additional step of looking for recognized 
(and recognizable) family structures to which this family could be 
compared.146 
Of course, one of the differences between these two cases is 
the willingness or unwillingness of each court to make the kind of 
leap of faith that we saw in the trans cases.147  One assumes that of 
course same-sex parents can be analogizable to heterosexual 
families; the other, that of course people who cannot marry cannot 
be like stepparents, let alone like heterosexual biological parents.  
These opposite stances arise from the same set of conditions—
same-sex couples just do not have children the same way that 
heterosexual couples do.  So any comparison between these gay 
and lesbian families and straight ones will be some kind of a 
stretch.  The question becomes how far the courts are willing to 
extend that stretch before it breaks apart.  And their inclination to 
do so ultimately depends at least in part upon untheorized beliefs 
about the validity of queer families. 
C. Thinking Sensibly—Avoiding Absurdity 
The ideological (although not necessarily politically partisan) 
divide between those courts viewing LGBT families and 
heterosexual ones as comparable and those not doing so plays itself 
out in the ways each describe the inevitability of their decisions.  It 
can also be found in the ways the courts characterize the alternative 
 
 143. 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
 144. Id. at 1072. 
 145. Id. at 1073. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See supra Part III.A. 
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positions.  If each side views its own understanding of the legal 
status of the queer family before it as not just rational but obvious, 
then it is only a short logical step to conclude that any contrary 
interpretation must therefore be ridiculous, even absurd.148  This 
has important doctrinal implications, because courts take for 
granted that in construing statutes they want to avoid the absurd, 
however they define it.  Absurdity implicates a very specific rule in 
the canons of statutory construction; statutes must be interpreted 
within the limits of what we might call common sense.149  But 
additionally, whether done honestly or disingenuously, framing 
opposing viewpoints as absurd has the effect of putting them on 
the defensive—conveniently, without having to argue or carefully 
reason through the point.  The examples discussed below suggest 
that this trope is exceedingly common in LGBT family law cases 
and can be employed by courts taking either a traditionalist 
position, or one favoring queer alternative families. 
What does it mean when courts dismiss positions they do not 
agree with as absurd?  In How to Do Things with Words, philosopher 
J.L. Austin offers a useful aid in thinking about such claims.150  
Austin describes what he terms “performative language”—language 
that does rather than states, reports, or describes, and enacts 
through speaking (“I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth” or “You’re 
out!”).151  Given the power of the courts to decide controversies and 
to construct interpretations of law, their words, at least those which 
cannot be set aside as mere dicta, are nearly always performative.  
 
 148. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z, 699 A.2d 1065, 1075 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1996) (stating its holding and noting that “[t]o do otherwise would lead to absurd 
results.”  Such rhetorical moves can be found in many cases in which an implicit 
worldview is taken for granted, despite the existence of sharply contrasting 
approaches to the issue at hand.  Perhaps the most well-known such maneuver is 
the U.S. Supreme Court majority’s characterization of the appellant’s claims in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) as “facetious” even in the face of a 
strong dissenting views (one drafted by Justice Blackmun, and joined by Justices 
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens; another drafted by Justice Stevens and joined by 
Justices Brennan and Marshall), and despite sufficient opposition to the case to 
lead to its being overturned less than two decades later in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 149. For an extensive and thoughtful examination of “absurdity” in statutory 
reading, see generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2387 (2003). 
 150. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina 
Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975) (compiling a series of lectures originally delivered in 
1955). 
 151. Id. 
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But performative language requires an agreement by all parties 
that the words spoken mean and do a particular thing, that the 
person uttering them is entitled and qualified to say them, and that 
once the words are spoken everyone involved will behave 
accordingly.152  Consequently, there are any number of ways in 
which performative language can derail.153 
Austin terms inaccuracies or inexactitude in performative 
language, or performative language by persons without power to 
execute the act, “infelicities.”154  Even more infelicitous, though, is 
the category that the courts imagine as absurd—utterances that are 
impossible, travesties of actual performatives “where there is not 
even a pretence of capacity or a colourable claim to it . . . no 
accepted conventional procedure.”155  These utterances are 
unhappy not because the speaker has no right to perform the act, 
or because the affected parties refuse to cooperate in the 
performance,156 but because under any circumstances the 
performative could not be successful.  It is in Austin’s terms, “a 
mockery, like a marriage with a monkey.”157 
Certainly for many jurists and legislators marriage between two 
women or two men is not far removed from marriage with a 
monkey, and is legally just as possible.158  That cartoonish image of 
unbelievable silliness seems to be precisely the way that courts 
invoking the language of the absurd would like to characterize any 
countervailing positions.  Similarly (or perhaps conversely), for 
other courts, denying the existence and legitimacy of queer families 
is quite apparently equally silly, or absurd. 
Consider a second-parent adoption case from Nebraska, In re 
Adoption of Luke.159  In its opinion, the Nebraska Supreme Court first 
observed uncontrovertibly that “[w]hen construing a statute, 
appellate courts are guided by the presumption that the Legislature 
intended a sensible, rather than an absurd, result in enacting a 
 
 152. Id. Lecture 2 at 14-15. 
 153. Id. at 17-18. 
 154. Id. at 14.  Austin considers such infelicities to be any “sin” against one or 
more of the rules he enumerates for language to be understood as truly 
performative. 
 155. Id. at 20. 
 156. “I pick Ruth for my team.”  “No thanks, I don’t feel like playing.”  Despite 
the initial performative language, Ruth is not now on the team.  See id. 
 157. Id. at 24. 
 158. Indeed, if we are to believe Justice Scalia, it may be a small step from the 
decriminalization of sodomy to gay marriage to marriage with a monkey. 
 159. 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002). 
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statute.”160  On the heels of this pronouncement the court noted 
that the state’s adoption statutes spell out procedures for co-parent 
adoption by legally-married stepparents.161  In light of this statutory 
provision the court determined that requiring the same-gender 
biological parent to relinquish parental status when a stepparent 
adopts would be “an absurd result.”162  But the court was patently 
unwilling to analogize such a situation to the circumstances faced 
by a same-sex couple.163  Instead, the court concluded with little 
trouble (and without citation) that the “parents’ parental rights 
must be terminated or the child must be relinquished in order for 
the child to be eligible for adoption.”164 
For this court then, the impossibility of extending the 
stepparent exception to same-sex parents was not merely self-
evident.  By inserting the notion of absurdity into its discussion of 
the meaning of the Nebraska stepparent adoption statute, the court 
strongly implied that any suggestion that the statute could be 
stretched to include the lesbian petitioner was itself inconceivable. 
But the assumption of absurdity is not inevitably linked to one 
particular stance.  For example, in In re Adoption of Baby Z, a case 
very much like In re Luke, the Superior Court of Connecticut 
introduces comparable rules of construction: “the adoption statutes 
can be construed ‘in a manner that will not thwart [their] intended 
purpose or lead to absurd results. . . . We must avoid a construction 
that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly 
on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve.’”165  But using this 
very similar interpretive tool, the Connecticut court came to a 
position exactly opposite of Nebraska’s.166 
Deciding to remand the case to the probate court so that the 
adoption could take place without terminating the biological 
mother’s rights, the Connecticut court concluded that to do 
otherwise “would lead to absurd results and thwart the legislative 
intent of the adoption statutes which is to promote the best 
 
 160. Id. at 382. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 382. 
 164. Id. at 382-83. 
 165. 699 A.2d 1065, 1073 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996), rev’d, 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 
1999) (quoting Turner v. Turner, 595 A.2d 297 (Conn. 1991)).  Though the 
decision was reversed, the superior court’s reasoning is still relevant to the point 
under discussion. 
 166. Id. at 1073-74. 
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interests of the child.”167  Moreover, the court cited an earlier New 
Jersey case using almost identical language:  “[T]he stepparent 
exception to the natural parent’s termination of rights should not 
be read literally and restrictively where to do so would defeat the 
best interests of the children and would produce a wholly absurd 
and untenable result.”168 
Ironically, despite such repeated imprecations against 
construing statutes to the point of absurdity, when faced with the 
task of applying statutory schemes to anomalous family 
constructions courts can on occasion push the bounds of credulity.  
Indeed, even when statutes encourage courts to interpret liberally, 
judges seem so constrained by the limits of the analogy required to 
understand queer families that they cannot expand their sense of 
what a family might be.  Two cases—one dealing with the 
dissolution of a marriage between a woman and her transsexual 
husband (In re Marriage of Simmons), the other a second-parent 
adoption (In re Angel Lace M.)—illustrate this problem. 
In re Angel Lace M.169 is somewhat different from other second-
parent adoption cases in that Annette G., the biological mother of 
the child, was legally married to the child’s biological father Terry 
M. when the child was conceived.170  Later, she and her female 
partner Georgina G. petitioned to allow Terry to relinquish his 
parental rights (which Terry was willing to do) in favor of 
Georgina.171  The Wisconsin adoption statute is quite clear that it 
should be construed as broadly as necessary “to affect the objectives 
contained in this section.  The best interests of the child shall 
always be of paramount consideration, but the court shall also 
consider the interest of the parents or guardian of the child.”172  In 
light of this directive to construe adoptions liberally, and given that 
all three parents concurred that it was in Angel’s best interest that 
Terry give up his parental rights and that Georgina adopt, it is 
somewhat surprising that the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not 
find the proposed adoption legally permissible.173  The court 
instead injected a series of slippery slope concerns, claiming that if 
 
 167. Id. at 1075. 
 168. Id. (quoting Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 538 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)). 
 169. 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994). 
 170. Id. at 680. 
 171. Id. at 681. 
 172. Id. at 681 n.3 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 48.01 (1993)). 
 173. Id. at 686. 
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Georgina be allowed to adopt, any random unrelated adult could 
disrupt families with spurious adoption claims.174  More ominously, 
the court mused that if “the trial court had the power to make any 
order it pleased so long as the order could somehow be justified by 
recitation of the rubric ‘in the best interests of the children,’ the 
limits the legislature placed on the court’s exercise of power in 
custody matters would be meaningless.”175  By the end of its 
opinion, the court held out the troubling vision of a child 
accumulating parents ad infinitum.176 
For the Wisconsin court, to construe the adoption statute 
broadly, as the statute itself says it ought to be, would produce on 
these facts “an absurd result.”177  It stated firmly that it would “not 
construe a statute so as to work absurd or unreasonable results.”178  
The idea that a biological father could give up his rights as a parent 
to benefit his ex-wife’s lesbian partner was inconceivable to the 
court: in a word, absurd.179  Even though the petitioners pointed to 
various provisions in the statute that would make such a ruling 
possible, the court itself refused the possibility.180  Having 
introduced the “absurd result” of a multiply-parented child, the 
court insisted that despite the statutory exhortation toward reading 
adoption rules permissively it was “harmoniz[ing] the rules of 
statutory construction” by determining that Georgina would have 
to lose her parental rights if Annette adopted Angel.181 
This anxiety about unfamiliar family forms and the attendant 
refusal to take statutory directives about liberal interpretation at 
their word appears even more strikingly in In re Marriage of Simmons, 
an Illinois divorce and custody case between Jennifer Simmons and 
her husband Sterling, a female-to-male transsexual.182  Jennifer and 
 
 174. Id. at 682-83. 
 175. Id. at 681. 
 176. Id. at 684. 
 177. Id. at 682. 
 178. Id. at 683. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 683-84. 
 181. Id. at 684.  It is worth noting that despite the fact that In re Angel Lace M. 
still stands as good law from the highest court in the state, more than thirty-five 
gay or lesbian second-parent adoptions have been granted in Wisconsin since the 
decision was handed down.  Mary Zahn, Adoptions for Same-Sex Couples Caught in 
Legal Limbo, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 2005, at A1, available at 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/state/sep05/358630.asp. 
 182. 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
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Sterling were married in Illinois in 1985.183  In 1991 Jennifer 
underwent artificial insemination, which resulted in the birth of a 
child.184  As Jennifer’s husband, Sterling was listed on the birth 
certificate as the father.185  In 1994, the Illinois State Registrar 
issued Sterling a new birth certificate with the gender designation 
of “male.”186 
When the couple split up, Jennifer contended that their 
marriage had been invalid and that Sterling’s consequent paternity 
of their child, legally conferred not through genetic ties but 
through his status as Jennifer’s husband, was similarly void.187  
Under the Illinois Parentage Act, if “a wife is inseminated 
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the 
husband shall be treated in law as if he were the natural father of 
the child thereby conceived.”188  As with many of these cases, the 
court determined that Sterling was not male but female, and hence 
agreed to nullify the Simmons’ marriage.189  The court then went 
on to nullify Sterling’s relationship with his child—if Sterling was 
not legitimately Jennifer’s husband, how could he be the child’s 
father?190 
However, the Parentage Act seemed to explicitly provide for 
this eventuality by declaring that a husband is presumed to be the 
father of his wife’s child “‘even though his marriage is or could be 
declared invalid, and the child is born or conceived during such 
marriage.’”191  But in spite of the statute’s language, the court 
stripped Sterling of parental rights by working backwards from its 
denial of his male gender.192  Concluding that “petitioner is not a 
man within the meaning of the statute,” the court found that the 
section of the parentage statute regarding invalid marriages did not 
apply to his now dissolved marriage.193  As in In re Angel Lace M., the 
court here seemed to ignore the plain meaning of the statute, 
which appears directly to require liberal construction of extant 
parent-child relationships.  Yet such a result was not considered by 
 
 183. Id. at 307. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3 (1984). 
 189. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309-10. 
 190. Id. at 313-14. 
 191. Id. at 311 (quoting 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5 (a)(1), (2) (1984)). 
 192. Id. at 311-12. 
 193. Id. at 312. 
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the court to be absurd. 
So what do all of the invocations of strict construction and the 
risk of absurdity tell us about the ways in which courts approach 
these cases?  Well, one of the things the court has to ask itself when 
deciding whether to recognize a queer family is simply what it is 
looking at.  This is true whether the court is making a judgment of 
category, as in the trans marriage cases, or a more complicated 
analogy, as in the second-parent adoption cases.  And many of the 
courts that are making determinations are ultimately basing them 
not on methodical reasoning, but by a seemingly irrefutable 
internal compass telling them what a family looks like, or at least 
what they assume the legislature thinks a family looks like.  This 
sense that it “knows what a family is when it sees it”194 may explain 
why, no matter how difficult or easy the court imagines its decision 
to be, another set of judges asking comparable questions can find it 
equally straightforward or complicated to reach precisely the 
opposite conclusion. 
The fact that some courts find the answer to that question to 
be easy and, not coincidentally, resolvable within a few pages, while 
other courts examine the question at length, does not change the 
fact that all of them are searching for ways to understand proposed 
new forms of family.  As with any truly novel situation in the law, 
when facing LGBT family law cases the courts must ask themselves 
how far and how hard they would have to push existing law in 
order to extend it to cover these alternative families.  The more 
attenuated they see the analogies between the queer families and 
those that are legally recognized, the more they must ask whether 
they do, or do not, have the authority to legitimize such families at 
all. 
IV.    THE METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY 
The final strand of judicial thinking that I see in the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender family law opinions involves the 
 
 194. This sentiment may be employed frequently in queer family law cases, but 
the dissent in In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010, 1015 (N.H. 2003) (New Hampshire 
adultery case) goes so far as to cite it directly.  Quoting Justice Stewart’s hoary 
observation about the indefinability, yet obviousness, of pornography, Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J, concurring), the dissent supports its 
conclusion that the majority’s limitation of the term “intimate extramarital sexual 
activity” to heterosexual sex was overly narrow and defied common sense.  
Branchflower, 834 A.2d at 1015 (Brock, C.J., dissenting). 
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courts’ consideration of their own roles and power.  When a court 
tries to answer any question in law it faces a series of decisions 
about how it will answer that question, and whether it ought, in 
fact, to be answering it at all.  I call this process of almost self-
reflective evaluation and decision-making the court’s 
“methodological inquiry.”  This methodological inquiry can take 
many forms, including extensive meditations on the meaning of 
the judiciary or passing asides about how the court performs its 
duties.  The most significant of these inquiries raise explicit 
substantive questions about the separation of powers among 
branches of government, and implicitly assume or even explicitly 
examine the authority of the judiciary itself. 
A. Thinking About Rules; Thinking About Roles 
The simplest and probably most unexceptional form of 
methodological inquiry can be found in jurists’ commentary 
informing the reader of the court’s intellectual process.  In such 
instances the court is staking out for itself, and announcing to its 
readers, the way it has proceeded in reasoning through its decision.  
When we look at LGBT family law cases, for example, we find (not 
surprisingly) that many of the questions raised by these cases 
require the interpretation of statutes.  Accordingly, a court will 
remind itself how it should set about doing that work.  It may 
invoke timeless principles of statutory language such as, “[w]e first 
look to the language of the statute itself and, where terms are not 
defined therein, ‘we ascribe to them their plain and ordinary 
meanings’”195 or, “[e]ach undefined word in [a] statute must be 
ascribed its ordinary and popularly understood meaning.”196  Given 
the complex and sometimes contradictory array of interpretive 
canons and guidelines traditionally available for such work,197 it 
 
 195. Blanchflower, 834 A.2d at 1011 (quoting Wegner v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 803 A.2d 598, 599 (N.H. 2002)). 
 196. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 311. 
 197. For a classic critique of the indeterminacy of the accepted canons of 
construction see Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950), 
reprinted in 5 GREEN BAG 2D 297 (2002).  See also Richard A. Posner, Statutory 
Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805-18 
(1983).  But see, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory 
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1999) (arguing for an empirical analysis of 
the normative defenses of canons); John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons’ 
Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283 (2002) (arguing that canons can be useful as 
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makes sense that judges would seek to explain and justify their 
reasoning by describing how, precisely, they went about reading 
and understanding the relevant statutes. 
But courts may also expand this methodological exploration 
beyond their means of reading statutes to incorporate their 
examination of their own responsibilities and obligations in a wider 
array of situations.  They might, for example, review their own 
authority to interpret common law: “‘[T]his Court should not 
hesitate to alter, amend, or abrogate the common law when 
society’s needs so dictate.’”198  They might also ask and answer 
questions about what sources they should view as authoritative 
when reaching their own decisions: “This being a case of first 
impression, we may consider cases from other jurisdictions that 
have dealt with this issue.”199 
These almost procedural examinations of the court’s 
reasoning process may carry with them embedded notions about 
the proper relationship between the enacters of law and the 
interpreters of it: “[I]f we can give effect to the ordinary meaning 
of the words adopted by the General Assembly, we must apply the 
statute as written.”200  But the kinds of discussions I am referencing 
here are not jurisdictional in any legal sense.  Nor do they 
themselves constitute the outcome or the meaning of the opinion.  
Rather, they are designed to remind the law-trained reader of a 
shared understanding of how courts ought to do their jobs.  Such 
comments tell us something about the process of the court’s 
reasoning—its methodology.  They function as signposts, making 
sure that the court and the reader share a common understanding 
of the rules of the road. 
Signposts can be illustrative and informational (“7th Avenue”), 
but they can also be directive and restrictive (“No Passing”).  
Similarly, courts’ broader methodological inquiries are not merely 
informational, but substantive and even determinative.  In such 
instances, while asking by what means it can reach its decision, the 
court is also asking whether it can.  That is, the court is examining its 
role in creating law, both as a supplement to and in contrast to the 
 
organizing principles for statutory interpretation). 
 198. In re the Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 
(quoting Sandy Ridge Oil Co. v. Centerre Bank Nat’l Ass’n 510 N.E.2d 667, 670 
(Ind. 1987)). 
 199. In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271, 282 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d on 
other grounds, 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005). 
 200. In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 492 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). 
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role of other governmental bodies.  It is defining the limits of its 
own authority.  When courts question their authority to render 
decisions, the very holding of the opinion may be bound into the 
court’s quest to determine how it ought to function. 
In In re Guido, for example, Frank Joseph Guido, Jr. petitioned 
New York Civil Court for a change of name to Cynthia Alexandria 
Frank.201  Guido was just beginning the process of transitioning to a 
female gender, and, without having yet begun sex reassignment 
surgery, was trying to start living full-time as a woman.202  Acting pro 
se, Guido requested a name change to facilitate the new identity.203  
The court twice refused the application, asking for a new petition 
certifying completed sex change surgery204 and clarifying Guido’s 
marital status.205  At the time of the petition Guido was legally 
married to a woman, and the court concluded that it could not 
grant the name change because it would “permit the applicant to 
appear and represent himself as female, while in fact he remains in 
a legal relationship with his wife premised on being male.”206 
When Guido applied for a name change for the third time 
with the assistance of counsel, the civil court took a very different 
approach.207  Granting the application, the court maintained that in 
the previous decisions it had “concerned itself with matters outside 
the scope of the court’s jurisdiction and beyond the scope of the 
inquiry necessary to avoid lending the court’s assistance to fraud.”208  
The judge hearing this new petition209 was persuaded that Guido 
was requesting only a name change, not a change in legally-
recognized gender.210  Accordingly, the only issue before the court 
was whether the name change was legitimate—that is, whether or 
 
 201. 771 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003). 
 202. Id. at 789-90. 
 203. Id. at 789. 
 204. Previous courts examining this application seemed convinced that the 
name change could only take place upon a doctor’s certification that sex 
reassignment was completed, while Guido’s physicians maintained that the name 
change was integral to the beginning of the sex reassignment process.  Id. at 790. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.  Once again, it is worth noting that a legal action which had previously 
been considered fairly mundane, changing names to accommodate a sex change, 
has been problematized by the specter of gay marriage. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. It is unclear from the opinion whether this is the same judge who had 
reviewed the earlier applications.  See id. 
 210. Id. at 791. 
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not it encouraged fraud.211  The significance of the name Frank 
Guido chose to adopt, though clearly female-identified, was legally 
irrelevant since “[t]he law does not distinguish between masculine 
and feminine names, which are a matter of social tradition.”212 
Through its methodological determination that examining any 
question other than Guido’s freedom to adopt a new name was 
irrelevant and thus beyond its scope, the Guido court cut off any 
possible debate about the legitimacy of sex changes, or whether a 
married transsexual should be viewed as having a heterosexual or 
homosexual relationship.213  It diverted attention solely to technical 
concerns, and expressed its indifference to the social world of 
gender.214  The approach resonates with the New Jersey court’s 
conclusion that the fact that two women’s wish to share the same 
last name has only to do with nomenclature, and nothing to do 
with gay marriage.215  As a matter of jurisprudence, such a 
determination may make enormous sense.  But in the context of 
swirling controversies over what even Justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court dub a “Kulturkampf,”216 these moves may also seem 
disingenuous. 
Frequently, a court’s examination of its authority in queer 
cases means asking itself how much of the social context 
surrounding a particular issue is appropriate for the court to 
grapple with.  If it is true that issues related to LGBT families, or 
even LGBT persons, are always controversial,217 then it becomes 
incumbent on the court to decide how much or how little of that 
controversy is relevant when deciding the case before it.218  As an 
 
 211. Id. at 790. 
 212. Id. at 791. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Id. at 790-91. 
 215. In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579, 585 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 216. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 217. The politicized nature of these topics can make any public discussion of 
them enormously complicated.  In an attempt to be “fair,” media representatives 
frequently attempt to give “both sides” of any issue involving LGBT families, 
infuriating queer activists who argue that doing so lends credence to bigotry.  And 
both queer and anti-gay activists are quick to critique media representations of 
LGBT issues that omit their perspectives.  See, e.g., Peter LaBarbera, Associated Press 
Says Story Celebrating Lesbian Students is “Fair,” CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AMERICA, Jan. 
16, 2003, http://www.cultureandfamily.org/articledisplay.asp?id=3079& 
department=CFI&categoryid=cfreport (criticizing AP’s defense as “fair and 
balanced” of an article that it ran about two lesbian high school students voted 
“cutest couple,” without offering any disapproving commentary). 
 218. See Beth Barrett, Defining Queer: Lesbian and Gay Visibility in the Courtroom, 
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Ohio case, In re Bicknell219 demonstrates, the court may choose to 
put the social ramifications of queer families aside, and find that 
the only issue before it is strictly statutory. 
The lesbian couple appealing in Bicknell asked the court to 
certify a change in their surnames to a combination of both 
partners’ last names, so that the partners could unify their joint 
family name before the birth of their first child.220  The Ohio 
Supreme Court’s opinion deliberately separated the social issue of 
a lesbian family seeking to present itself as such from the narrow 
legal question presented by name change requests.221  For the 
court, the only question at issue was whether the petitioners were 
misrepresenting themselves.222  Since their desire for a name 
change does in fact accurately represent their situation—they are 
two adults expecting a child and desiring to have a surname in 
common—there was no fraud, and their applications were 
therefore reasonable and proper.223 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Bicknell dissent countered this 
approach by explicitly invoking the social context of the name 
change.224  The dissenting opinion charges that allowing the 
petitioners to change their names lends “the stamp of state 
approval” to their relationship, which is “directly contrary to the 
state’s position against same sex and common-law marriages.”225  
That petitioners’ inability to legally marry in Ohio is unchallenged 
is irrelevant.  For the dissent, not only are they taking a step toward 
portraying themselves as “married,” but the majority opinion is by 
default making social policy in allowing them to do so.226  With such 
hotly-contested social policy at issue, then, the dissent concluded 
that the majority had stepped beyond its role and rendered a 
decision which “should clearly be made by the General Assembly 
after a full public debate and discourse, not by judicial 
legislation.”227 
In the majority opinion, by contrast, the social context of gay 
 
12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 143, 176 (2000) (arguing that gay litigants tend to succeed 
when their experiences are manifest in the courtroom). 
 219. 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002). 
 220. Id. at 847. 
 221. Id. at 848-49. 
 222. Id. at 848. 
 223. Id. at 849. 
 224. Id. at 849 (Stratton, J., dissenting). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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marriage was irrelevant.228  The court observed that 
appellants’ only stated purpose for changing their names 
is to carry the same surname to demonstrate their level of 
commitment to each other and to the children that they 
planned to have.  Both acknowledge that same-sex 
marriages are illegal in Ohio, and it is not their intention 
to have this court validate a same-sex union by virtue of 
granting the name-change applications.229 
More importantly, the court removed itself from commenting on 
the public policy implications of its decision, because “any 
discussion . . . on the sanctity of marriage, the well-being of society, 
or the state’s endorsement of nonmarital cohabitation is wholly 
inappropriate and without any basis in law or fact.”230  There is a 
certain common sense in the majority’s approach: when the 
question before the court is an uncontested issue of nomenclature, 
and in the absence of fraud (in which case the law allows a great 
deal of liberty in changing one’s name), it could seem excessively 
zealous or even petty to refuse to allow the Bicknell appellants to do 
so. 
While that may be true, though, it is hard to say honestly that 
the social context does not hang heavily over the questions before 
this court.  It may be appropriately put aside jurisprudentially, but 
we can see that in doing so the court is (deliberately or not) 
sidestepping the policy facet of the case.  The litigants themselves 
recognize this—were it not for their desire to be recognized as a 
family—a social category as well as a legal one—they would not 
likely be seeking the name change in the first place.231 
One could argue that the Ohio court effectively dodged the 
methodological question by claiming that the name change was 
both private (solely about this couple and their potential 
child[ren]) and statutory rather than public and legislative.  Yet 
whether it says so or not, the court was making a methodological 
argument by taking for granted that it is within its power to grant 
the name change.  Doing so required the court to assert that it was 
proper to limit the inquiry to questions of fraud and 
misrepresentation.  When the courts in Guido and Bicknell set aside 
the social issue to focus on the purely legal, they may be doing 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 849. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id. at 847. 
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something that is both legally and socially correct, but that 
literalism can feel naïve to the opponents of gay rights, and 
certainly can be read as not simply legal but also strategic. 
More importantly, when questions of LGBT families arise in 
more legally complicated or politically fraught contexts, courts are 
under even more pressure.  The discounting of social policy in an 
area of law where petitioners have broad leeway seems complicated 
enough.  But the thorny questions of judicial role in policy-making 
(or at least, in crafting legal decisions that arguably shape important 
social policy) become even more complicated in cases affording 
litigants fewer liberties, or demanding more exacting interventions 
by the courts.  It is exactly that question of the relevance of social 
policy that can make courts ask, just as the Bicknell dissent does, 
whether they ought to be deciding these questions at all. 
B.  The Dance of Deference 
Queer family law cases are hardly unique in raising questions 
of policy, but as a category they do pose a unique challenge to the 
judiciary.  Though the gay or transgendered litigants seeking 
recognition of their families may pose their questions to the court 
narrowly, presenting them simply as questions of legal 
application,232 opponents of alternative families see such cases as 
arenas of vital social, cultural and even moral significance.233  
Courts taking differing views on the cultural consequences of these 
cases will naturally have different views on their own roles in 
deciding them. 
The accepted legitimacy of judge-made law is foundational in a 
common law system.234  Nevertheless, within the legal system of the 
United States, the cliché is that the power given to the judiciary is 
 
 232. Litigants may pose such questions whether or not they themselves actually 
believe this, or have simply adopted it as a rhetorical strategy. 
 233. For example: “The evidence demonstrates incontrovertibly that the 
homosexual lifestyle is inconsistent with the proper raising of children.  
Homosexual relationships are characteristically unstable and are fundamentally 
incapable of providing children the security they need.”  Timothy J. Dailey,  
Homosexual Parenting: Placing Children at Risk, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IS01J3 (last visited Dec. 27, 2005); see also Peter S. 
Sprigg, Defending the Family: Why We Resist Gay Activism, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=PD01L1 (last visited Dec. 27, 2005). 
 234. For a foundational and still-relevant rumination on the role of judges in 
crafting common law, see BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1921). 
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to interpret law, not to initiate it.235  At the infancy of the American 
court system John Marshall observed that “[i]t is the peculiar 
province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the 
government of society.”236  It is incumbent upon courts, then, to 
know their place—to leave to elected lawmakers the job of making 
new law.  It is therefore not surprising to find in judicial opinions 
addressing seemingly novel questions about the legal recognition 
of queer families a fair amount of rumination about whether doing 
so is a matter of interpreting law or making it. 
The line between the interpretation and the creation of law is 
hard to discern, however, and we have never achieved national 
consensus on where that line might lie.  In fact, the debate over 
exactly that point informs Supreme Court decisions regarding 
controversial social questions such as school busing,237 abortion,238 
and more germane to this project, gay marriage.239  Volumes of 
commentary have been produced regarding differing judicial 
philosophies, their alignment with political affiliations, and their 
jurisprudential consequences.240  This contentiousness regarding 
 
 235. Even Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175-77 (1803), in which the Supreme 
Court established for itself the right to interpret the meaning of the Constitution, 
is careful to reserve only for Congress the right to enact legislation. 
 236. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 136 (1810). 
 237. Though Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is nowadays 
generally regarded as correctly decided and well-settled, it does not similarly follow 
that the subsequent implementation of decisions beginning with Brown II, 349 U.S. 
294 (1955), and extending through such decisions as Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Keyes v. School District. No. 1, 
413 U.S. 189 (1973), are accepted with equal equanimity.  The latter have been 
more widely criticized as examples of overreaching by the judiciary.  See, e.g., DAVID 
J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW (1995). 
 238. There can be no doubt that the national debate over the Court’s 
legalization of at least some abortions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), led in 
great part to the differing notions of privacy rights articulated in Roe and Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 239. The Massachusetts Supreme Court has been widely derided as 
inappropriately “activist” by opponents of its decision in Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  See, e.g., President George W. Bush, 
Remarks at the 2004 Republican National Convention (Sept. 2, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040902-2.html (“I support 
the protection of marriage against activist judges.  And I will continue to appoint 
federal judges who know the difference between personal opinion and strict 
interpretation of the law.”). 
 240. See JOHN MAKDISI, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1-238 (2d ed. 2000) (introducing commonalities and differences of 
some of the varying schools of jurisprudence); see also PETER SUBER, THE CASE OF 
THE SPELUNCEAN EXPLORERS: NINE NEW OPINIONS (1998) (reprinting Lon Fuller’s 
classic law review article offering six fictional judicial opinions representing 
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the proper role of the courts generates methodological 
pronouncements about what questions are and are not 
appropriately within the judicial purview.  It is a short distance 
from awareness of the social implications of a case to a 
methodological inquiry constituting the substantive determination 
of a question before the court. 
Of course some LGBT family law cases do pose straightforward 
questions of judicial authority, making their methodological 
inquiries unquestionably necessary.  In Bacalod v. Superior Court, for 
example, the California Court of Appeal was asked to order a 
change in the recorded sex on the birth certificate of a plaintiff 
who had been born in the Philippines and completed gender 
reassignment in Canada.241  California statutes establish procedures 
for recognizing the change in gender of a person born within the 
state, but the Bacalod court found no authority permitting it to 
revise the birth certificate issued by a foreign jurisdiction.242  Since 
“it is not the role of this court to expand the statutory scheme to 
accommodate the circumstances of this case,” the opinion 
suggested that Bacalod’s concerns were “properly directed to the 
Legislature.”243  Such statements, which are essentially the 
substantive holdings of their decisions, intuitively make sense to 
legal readers who understand the restraint that courts must show. 
But when the limitations of courts’ interpretive role are 
invoked because of the policy debate surrounding the status of gay 
families, the significance of the methodological inquiry becomes 
more apparent, more controversial, and more stark.  This can be 
seen in Littleton v. Prange, the case in which a transsexual woman 
brought a wrongful death suit against a doctor who treated her 
husband.244  The Littleton court was careful to point out not only 
that the case was one of first impression, but also that it involved 
“important matters of public policy for the state of Texas.”245  The 
policy question at issue in the case was to “determine what 
guidelines should govern the recognition of marriages involving 
 
different philosophies of law, and adding new opinions to capture contemporary 
strains of legal philosophy). 
 241. Bacalod v. Superior Court, No. B175091, 2005 WL 712316, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Mar. 30, 2005). 
 242. Id. at *2-3. 
 243. Id. at *3 n.5. 
 244. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. App. 1999). 
 245. Id. at 230. 
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transsexuals.” 246  Framed that way, it is not difficult to see why this 
should be the work of the legislature rather than the judiciary. 
It stands to reason, then, that throughout its decision, the 
Littleton court indiscriminately cast the issue before it as biological, 
sociological (even when those categories contradict each other) 
and legislative, but not at all judicial.247  The opinion maintained 
that “this court has no authority to fashion a new law on 
transsexuals,” suggesting that Littleton was a case about 
“transsexuals” rather than about giving credit to the marriage 
license that was issued to the couple in Kentucky, or about the 
wrongful death of Littleton’s husband.248  The court aligned the 
questions before it with “metaphysical arguments . . . involving 
desire and being, the essence of life and the power of mind over 
physics,” and defined Littleton’s assertions about her marriage and 
her claims against the doctor as belonging to “the misty fields of 
sociological philosophy.”249  The court then found that “[m]atters 
of the heart do not always fit neatly within the narrowly defined 
perimeters of statutes.”250  After such pronouncements it is not hard 
to conclude that determining Littleton to have legally altered her 
gender would require the court to venture into the realm of 
lawmaking. 
Nonetheless, in disavowing its authority to decide in Littleton’s 
favor, the court cannot be said to have remained neutral in matters 
of policy.  After all, the Littleton decision does firmly settle some 
rather debatable points.  First, Christie Littleton is still legally male 
in the State of Texas, and second, even if she is no longer a man, 
she is a transsexual, which is not the same thing as a woman.251  This 
is significant because according to the court, it is up to the 
legislature to decide whether transsexuals can qualify as lawful 
spouses.252  By deeming the case to be about the gender status of a 
transsexual, Littleton’s claim that as her husband’s widow she is 
entitled to sue for wrongful death suddenly exceeds the court’s 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 227, 230-31. 
 248. See id. at 230. 
 249. Id. at 231. 
 250. Id. 
 251. In an enumerated series of conclusions, the court states its most pivotal 
finding baldly, and without citation: “Biologically a post-operative female 
transsexual is still a male.”  Id. at 230.  In this breathtakingly simple syllogism, the 
court embraces the language and concept of transsexual gender identity and sex-
reassignment surgery, while soundly rejecting the viability of actual change in sex. 
 252. Id. 
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interpretive responsibility.  Despite its allusions to the legislative 
prerogatives of metaphysics and sociology, though, the Littleton 
court is not really sidestepping larger philosophical questions.  Its 
refusal to recognize Christie Littleton as a woman (something that 
the court in M.T. v. J.T.253 in New Jersey in 1976 had no trouble 
doing) is a de facto policy decision.  Since the court frames the 
issues as gender status and judicial deference, it may 
methodologically absolve itself from overstepping its authority, but 
it can not fairly deny that its conclusion ripples the pond of cultural 
debate over gender and marital status. 
It is important to note, too, that like other interpretative or 
rhetorical strategies a court may adopt, a methodological inquiry 
regarding a specific question does not always lead to a 
predetermined answer.  However unimpeachable any particular 
court’s methodological determination of its proper role may seem, 
there are likely to be alternative ways to define that same court’s 
authority.  This can be seen in the numerous cases in which 
comparable courts facing comparable questions have ended their 
own methodological examinations with entirely divergent 
conclusions.  The Ohio and Indiana courts of appeals, for example, 
grappled with second-parent adoption cases within a few years of 
each other and ended up on opposite sides of the fence, even 
though both courts followed very similar processes of examining 
their own authority. 
In the Ohio case, In re Adoption of Doe, the nonbiological 
mother of a child sought to adopt her daughter without the 
surrender of the parental rights of her partner, the child’s 
biological mother. 254  The lower court rejected the petition, and 
Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed.255  The appellate court found 
that adoption in Ohio is “a creature of statute.  Therefore, the 
general rule that issues not available at common law but subject to 
statutory creation must be strictly construed must be applied.”256  
This is a clear methodological move, defining the case as statutory 
and delimiting the court’s role to strictly applying the statute as 
written.  Since the statutes generally demanded the termination of 
prior parental rights before a new parent of the same gender could 
adopt a child, the court’s hands were tied—it had to follow the 
 
 253. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 210-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
 254. In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
 255. Id. at 1071, 1073. 
 256. Id. at 1072. 
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letter of the law, and accordingly deny the petition.257 
The petitioner’s assertion that the second-parent adoption was 
in the child’s best interests had no place in the proceedings, 
according to the court.258  Since the best interests of the child 
standard “pertains to the adoption process, not to the legal effects 
of the adoption,” arguing for the child’s interests in order to 
change the status of the parents is, in the words of the court, 
putting “the cart before the horse.”259  Framed this way, the court’s 
decision is not really about the child at all, but about the legal 
status of the parents, or, rather, what Ohio law has to say about who 
qualifies as a parent.260 
While one may or may not like the conclusion reached by the 
Ohio court, it nonetheless seems to make sense.  Adoption is a 
statutory matter, the statute is quite clear about the termination of 
parental rights in the case of adoption, and other issues do not 
apply.  But the opinion feels murkier when we consider that the 
Indiana Court of Appeals, looking at a nearly identical case, 
interpreted its obligations under its own statutes quite differently in 
In re Adoption of M.M.G.C.261  There, a woman also petitioned for 
second-parent adoption of the children she and her partner were 
raising, and the lower court also denied the petition as not 
specifically allowed under Indiana family law.262  But its own 
 
 257. Id. at 1073. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Unspoken in the opinion, but explicit in Judge John W. Wise’s 
concurrence to the decision, is the social policy element of the case.  See id.  (Wise, 
J., concurring).  Judge Wise argues that underlying the case is: 
the legal reality that two individuals of the same sex cannot marry under 
existing Ohio law and therefore, both cannot be spouses.  Until such 
time as the General Assembly of Ohio changes the law pertaining to 
same-sex marriages or rewrites the adoption statutes to specifically allow 
the requested legal relationship, I cannot interpret the existing adoption 
statute as contemplating a spousal relationship between two individuals 
of the same sex such as to create a stepparent relationship in a legal 
context. 
Id.  What is interesting here is that although the concurrence does raise social 
policy and legislative questions, the decision itself does not, instead leaning 
exclusively on statutory construction for its argument. 
 261. 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 262. Id. at 269.  The only difference between the two cases is that in this case 
the children were adopted rather than born to the initial mother.  Id. at 268.  The 
court makes this distinction, maintaining that its decision does not “reach the 
question of whether a second-parent adoption would divest all rights of a 
biological parent with respect to the child where the child’s prospective adoptive 
parent and the child’s biological parent are not married to each other.”  Id. at 270.  
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methodological examination led the Indiana court to reverse the 
lower court’s finding and remand the case for reconsideration of 
the adoption.263 
Like the court in Ohio, the Indiana court looked closely at the 
adoption statutes to determine what course of action it should 
take.264  And as in Ohio, the statute did not provide any explicit 
guidance as to how to treat such a new issue.265  Still further 
following the Ohio pattern, the court consequently held that 
Indiana statutes did not recognize the possibility that an unrelated 
person would seek to adopt a child without divesting the initial 
parent of her parental rights.266  In Ohio, this absence of specific 
permission for second-parent adoption was taken to mean that 
none was allowed: no statute, no adoption.267  The Indiana court 
decided instead that it must look next to common law, i.e. to 
questions purely within its own purview.268  Of course, this itself 
raised questions since for most of American history, adoption lay 
outside the stream of common law.269  But a brief look at the history 
of adoption in Indiana’s jurisprudence demonstrated to the court’s 
satisfaction that the overriding concern in adoption has been the 
best interests of the child.270  The court then concluded without 
reservation that formalizing the children’s legal relationship with 
both of the parents who were raising them would be in their best 
interest.271 
This final foray into common law is a very different 
methodology from that of the Ohio court.  Turning to common law 
removes any question about the court’s competence to decide the 
issue.  Moreover it shifts the methodological focus from strict 
construction to a more flexible way of understanding law, since, as 
the court claims, “[t]he strength and genius of the common law lies 
in its ability to adapt to the changing needs of the society it 
governs.”272  In Indiana, the absence of statutory guidance, then, 
 
However, methodologically, the court follows the same procedure as the Ohio 
court. 
 263. Id. at 271. 
 264. Id. at 270. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id.  
 267. See In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
 268. In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d at 270. 
 269. Id. (citing In re Perry, 148 N.E. 163, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1925)). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d at 270 (quoting Brooks v. 
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does not foreclose a judicial determination on the merits of the 
adoption.273  On the contrary, it makes space for a broader, more 
generous interpretation of the law, based upon the potential for 
the “financial, spiritual, educational, and emotional well-being of 
the child in a stable, supportive, and nurturing environment.”274 
The larger question here is not how, but in what contexts these 
two contrasting courts invoke their methodological inquiries.  What 
are the circumstances that lead courts to choose one approach over 
another?  In the main it seems that courts search for a solid 
methodological foundation for their decisions when the issue 
before them appears imbued with a social significance.  The more 
important, far-reaching, and potentially controversial their decision 
seems, the more appropriate it might be to leave it to the political 
process. 
But even though all sides of an issue can use methodological 
examination of their roles and responsibilities to frame or even 
commend their positions, this strategy is not employed equally by 
all sides.  Courts are far more likely to discuss the parameters of 
their power when they are asserting that they do not have authority 
on a particular point, then when they conclude that they do.  In 
some ways this is self-evident.  When a court takes its authority for 
granted it does not need to proclaim its right to adjudicate a given 
 
Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972)). 
 273. Nor does it necessarily open up that possibility either.  In a similar 
adoption case in Colorado, In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1996), the petitioners claimed that because the statutes were silent about the 
termination of parental rights in the case of a second-parent adoption, and 
because previous decisions had determined that in ambiguous cases courts should 
read statutes liberally, the court should read the adoption statute broadly.  Id. at 
492.  The Colorado court disagreed, stating that “liberal construction does not 
permit a court to rewrite the statute; instead, this principle may be used only to 
uphold the beneficial intent of the General Assembly when the wording of the 
statute creates a doubt.”  Id.  Even when presented with the possibility of shaping 
the statute in favor of the petitioners, the court tossed the responsibility of 
decision-making back to the legislature in intent if not in action.  By contrast, in a 
New Jersey case, In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1995), the statute itself commands that adoption law “be liberally 
construed to the end that the best interests of children be promoted.”  Id. at 538 
(quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:3-37 (1999)).  For this court, the absence of an explicit 
statutory prohibition on second-parent adoption, coupled with the mandate to 
read the statute liberally, leads to the decision that “the stepparent exception to 
the natural parent’s termination of rights should not be read literally and 
restrictively,” and that the second mother should be awarded the rights of 
adoption.  Id. at 538-39. 
 274. In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d at 271. 
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issue.  The fact that the court comes to a decision is itself an 
assertion of its authority to do so.  However even this tacit and 
unexamined assumption of authority in LGBT family cases is itself a 
trace of an occluded authoritative moment.  In the wake of fierce 
political and cultural debate over queer family forms in general, 
and gay marriage in particular, cases asking for legal recognition of 
LGBT families almost inevitably raise methodological questions as 
courts wrestle with the intersection of judicial, political, and social 
spheres.  Even silence about the methodological role of the court 
can be interpreted as a strategic decision either to normalize queer 
families or to suggest their utter marginality to pre-existing family 
forms.275  And if a case includes a dissent, an explicit 
methodological inquiry in one part of the opinion makes the 
absence of a corresponding analysis in the other seem quite 
deliberate.276 
All this is to say that courts are acutely conscious of the policy 
implications of the decisions they make about queer families.  
Whether they say so openly or not, this consciousness leads to a 
closer, more explicit examination by the courts of their role in 
determining the meaning of “family” as a social phenomenon and 
as a legal structure.  This brings us back to the question of how the 
family relationships before the court are framed.  As we have seen, 
 
 275. See, e.g., C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1151 (Me. 2004) (holding that 
the lesbian former partner of a biological mother was a de facto parent to the 
child that the two had raised and could be considered for an award of parental 
rights).  The court’s decision is grounded in equity and a consideration of the 
child’s best interests, and thus predicated almost entirely on factual conclusions.  
Though the concurring opinion offers further support for the decision in Maine’s 
family law statutes, these legal interpretations were not incorporated in the court’s 
main opinion.  It is difficult to read the opinions and fail to conclude that the 
Supreme Judicial Court had deliberately focused on the facts of the case and 
sidestepped any potential controversy over the statutory of common law bases for 
finding there to be potentially two parents of the same gender. 
 276. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 
2001), for example, permitted a lesbian parent to sue for partial custody and 
visitation of a child she had raised with her former partner, the child’s biological 
mother.  Id. at 920.  With almost no methodological inquiry, the majority 
concluded that there was a common law basis to conclude that petitioner stood “in 
loco parentis,” and therefore had standing to proceed with her petition.  See id.  
The dissent not only disagreed and found substantial statutory support for its 
position, but determined that the majority opinion conflicted with “an express 
legislative design,” hence exceeding the authority of the court.  Id. at 922 (Saylor, 
J., dissenting).  The methodological examination in the dissent makes the majority 
opinion, which lacks a correlating examination, read quite differently than it 
would if it stood on its own. 
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a court’s understanding of the closeness or distance between queer 
family forms and traditional ones is integrally connected to that 
court’s understanding of the limits of its interpretive authority.  
Courts can negotiate the intensity of social and political debate 
over queer families by drawing close analogies to those already 
legally recognized.  In so doing, they essentially represent decisions 
in favor of LGBT litigants as minor interpretive tinkering with 
extant legal doctrine.  Conversely, the courts can say that LGBT 
families are a whole different animal from their heterosexual 
counterparts, and use methodological arguments to conclude that 
it is not appropriate to confer legitimate status on them through 
common law. 
Either way, it is quite common for these same courts to deny 
the link between their legal holdings and the social phenomena 
that generated the cases in the first place.  Courts on both sides of 
the divide frequently insist that the LGBT family law cases before 
them are not about sexuality, the legality of gay marriage, or 
whether queer people make good parents, but are solely about 
some narrow question of legal interpretation.  In Blanchflower, the 
case in which the court concluded that a lesbian extramarital 
relationship could not be defined as adulterous, the court insisted 
that “this appeal is not about the status of homosexual relationships 
in our society or the formal recognition of homosexual unions.  
The narrow question before us is whether a homosexual sexual 
relationship between a married person and another constitutes 
adultery within the meaning of [the New Hampshire statute].”277 
Similarly, when several sets of lesbian and gay parents were 
granted new Virginia birth certificates for children who had been 
co-adopted in Washington, D.C. in Davenport v. Little-Bowser, the 
majority sternly reprimanded the dissent that 
it is important to state what this case is not about.  There 
was much discussion in the trial court, and some before 
this Court, concerning homosexual marriage.  This case is 
about issuing birth certificates under the provisions of 
Virginia law; it is not about homosexual marriage, nor is it 
about “same-sex” relationships, nor is it about adoption 
policy in Virginia.278 
And again (although more concisely), the court granting the 
lesbian couple’s name change in In re Bicknell declared that “in 
 
 277. In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010, 1011 (N.H. 2003). 
 278. Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366, 369 (Va. 2005). 
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spite of the unique circumstances involved, the only issue before us 
is whether the appellants’ request to change their surnames is 
reasonable and proper under [the statute].”279 
Whether courts find for or against queer litigants, this anxiety 
about whether they are dealing with legal or social issues (why can 
they not be both?) permeates the decisions.  The courts 
aggressively, even defensively, insist upon the legal grounding of 
their decisions.  Yet despite this insistence, the rich variety of ways 
different courts can discuss, define, and use their own interpretive 
authority suggests that the realm of the “purely legal” is far-
reaching indeed.  So we might ask a corollary question:  What is it 
that pushes courts towards a broader or a narrower interpretation 
of family law, particularly when the broader analysis usually favors 
queer families?  Why does what is ostensibly the same 
methodological process lead to such differing judicial opinions? 
Ultimately, the answer seems to be not statutory but cultural.  
That is to say, when courts believe that the social ramifications of 
finding for queer litigants are too radical, they use methodological 
explanations to support their unwillingness to venture into such 
controversy.  Conversely, a court that is comfortable with 
broadening the definitions of family can offer simple justifications 
for its authority to do so, or omit them entirely and proceed 
directly to its reasoning.  This may seem self-evident, but in fact it is 
a crucial insight into the courts’ interpretive workings.  It 
demonstrates that the issue in gay family cases is not simply 
whether a court cleaves to or distances itself from a strict statutory 
reading, or even whether the court is “conservative” or “liberal.” 
Rather, the courts’ rulings have their source in a much more 
amorphous grounding—their definition of their own authority and 
the tangled intersection between redefining family forms and 
judicial power.  Meanwhile, it is no doubt true that when a court 
claims the power to interpret statutes to permit recognition of 
LGBT families it is implicitly arguing for its own authority in 
shaping the American family.  But it is equally true that when a 
court maintains that such authority redounds to the legislature it is 
also shaping the American family.  The difference is that the second 
court is shaping public policy by omission rather than by 
commission.  While the courts continue to insist that their 
decisions are only about statutes and not about “same-sex 
 
 279. In re Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846, 847-48 (Ohio 2002). 
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relationships,” “gay marriage,” “homosexual rights,” and 
“transsexuals,” their declarations show even more clearly how 
inseparable legal interpretation can be from social phenomena.  
Ultimately, the methodological is intertwined with the cultural, the 
analogical with the ideological, the statutory with the social, and 
the precedential with the political. 
V.  CONCLUSION. 
When courts maintain that they do not have the authority to 
apply statutes to new definitions of family, they end up affirming 
the status quo.  In fact, that is exactly what such opinions mean to 
do—whether through concern purely for the proper function of 
the branches of government, out of political conviction, or from 
some combination of the two—a court concluding that “this isn’t 
our job,” says implicitly, “let’s leave things the way they are unless 
someone else wants to change them.”280  Meaning, of course, that 
legally recognizing the family at issue will have to wait for a later 
time, or another process.  Intentional or not, the consequence of 
such a determination by the courts is that queer families lose— 
children, marriages, inheritances, even identities. 
So when do courts wash their hands of such questions?  
Obviously the unique legal schemes of the various states may make 
such a conclusion more, or less necessary.  Specific jurisdictions 
may have distinctive precedents or accepted means of statutory 
interpretation that push courts more or less strongly toward or 
away from such a conclusion.  But leaving aside for a moment 
jurisdictional idiosyncrasies, the times when a court is most likely to 
say that it does not have the authority to do what proponents of 
LGBT families are asking are likely to be when the court is most 
acutely conscious of what it perceives to be the sea change in social 
policy that such recognition would entail. 
In other words, the more the gay family is framed as being 
 
 280. Which may be unlikely given the popular support for gay families.  
Conventional wisdom suggests that the fear of gay marriage was responsible for 
substantial Republican victories in the 2004 elections, and an immediate backlash 
of eleven state DOMAs enacted by popular vote.  Commentators have criticized 
the rather reductive conclusion that the gay marriage issue was the primary 
explanation for the election results, but there is general agreement that the issue 
is a galvanizing one for social conservatives.  See Susan Ryan-Vollmar, The Blame 
Game: Marriage Wins Didn’t Cause DOMA Losses, BAY WINDOWS ONLINE, Nov. 11, 
2004, http://www.baywindows.com (search for the article from Bay Windows 
website). 
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foreign, new, and carrying with it a huge social weight, the more 
conscious the court is of the political controversy of what it is 
doing, and the more questions are raised about whether the court 
is empowered to render a decision.  If a court believes that allowing 
lesbians and gay men to be parents to children within a nuclear-
style family, rather than resembling the heterosexual family, 
renders it more alien, then judges will shy away from what they see 
as creating a new family form.  However, if lesbian parents with 
children, or a transsexual man and his wife, seem fairly 
indistinguishable from their biologically gendered, heterosexual 
counterparts, a court imagines itself as applying the law, not 
constructing a new social category. 
So the factual framing of the case becomes inextricably bound 
up with its methodological reasoning.  The way the courts see the 
cases before them cannot be separated from the way they 
understand their role in deciding these cases.  These factors work 
synergistically—the bigger the reach of the factual framing, the 
more the question of authority is implicated, and the converse is 
equally true.  Deciding that Christie Littleton is “really” a man is 
part and parcel of deciding that a court cannot rule on the issue of 
“transsexual marriage,” and vice versa.  If the court were not 
inclined to delegitimate transsexual gender identification, then the 
question of “transsexual marriage” would not even emerge, since 
Littleton would simply be a lawfully-certified widow petitioning to 
sue her late husband’s doctor.  Similarly, the concept of 
“transsexual marriage” raises the issue of possible marriage 
structures outside the status quo, an issue that has been explicitly 
addressed by various state DOMAs. 
This, then, is what I mean by the term “authoritative moment.”  
It is a turning point in which a decision’s substantive reasoning, 
factual framing, and methodological inquiry meet.281  It may 
sometimes be clearly marked in an opinion, and other times may 
be an underlying predicate to the court’s opinion, obscured as the 
decision is written.  It is my contention, however, that the 
authoritative moment is not simply a signpost speeding the court 
along its way, but can instead be the court’s destination.  It emerges 
 
 281. Because it is almost impossible to talk about such a concept spatially—
that is, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to locate it precisely in the text of the 
opinion—I use a temporal metaphor to suggest that at some point these factors all 
come together, even if the text of the opinion does not itself show us precisely 
where that point is. 
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when courts are engaged in defining their role in a given case.282  It 
is the sum of the array of sub-determinations which must come 
together before a court can know how to handle a new queer 
family—legal, factual, and methodological.  What in any given 
decision may seem like throat clearing is actually a court’s act of 
orienting itself so that it can get down to the serious business of 
weighing the facts and coming to a determination. 
The authoritative moment is discernable in statements like this 
one in Parentage of L.B, granting a non-biological non-adoptive 
second parent the right to sue for custody and visitation of a child 
she and her former partner planned and raised together: “In sum, 
recognition of de facto parentage, in appropriate circumstances 
such as those alleged in this case, is in accord with existing 
Washington family law and reflects the evolving nature of families 
in Washington.”283  Such a statement cannot exist without 
simultaneous determinations that: 1) a two-mother household is 
cognizable in Washington law; 2) such a family is analogizable to 
already understood and legally sanctioned family forms; 3) even 
though no statute or prior case law expressly permits recognizing a 
parenting relationship in such circumstances, the fact that none 
prohibits one permits or requires the court to determine whether 
recognizing one in this case makes sense; and finally, 4) here, 
under these facts, such a parenting relationship can be found.  All 
of these conclusions, intertwined, articulated explicitly or not, must 
underlie the court’s holding, so that it can be legitimately set forth 
in the subsequent sentence.284 
As a metaphorical, perhaps merely theoretical moment in time, 
the complex set of analyses I am referring to may only rarely be 
expressly spelled out in a given opinion.  Perhaps the 
interconnectedness of some of these issues will not even be 
developed with full consciousness by the court.  Nonetheless, this 
authoritative moment is, at least for these queer family law 
 
 282. I have argued earlier that “recourse to the language of methodological 
authority often defines the parameters of what a court believes an issue is about 
(or wants to insist it is about).”  Kris Franklin, The Rhetorics of Legal Authority: 
Constructing Authoritativeness, the “Ellen Effect,” and the Example of Sodomy Law, 33 
RUTGERS L.J. 49, 101 (2001). 
 283. In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271, 285 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d on 
other grounds, 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005). 
 284. “Accordingly we hold that a common-law claim of de facto or 
psychological parentage exists in Washington such that Carvin can petition for 
shared parentage or visitation with L.B.”  Id. 
61
Franklin: The "Authoritative Moment": Exploring the Boundaries of Interpret
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
07FRANKLIN.DOC 1/20/2006  4:17:31 PM 
716 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
opinions, a crucial site of decision making even when it does not 
represent itself as such.285 
In fact, a significant number of these decisions do not 
ruminate upon procedural or jurisdictional issues, but rather take 
for granted that they either are or are not qualified to rule on the 
question at hand, often with little discussion and little or no 
support.  In the New York second-parent adoption case, Alison D. v. 
Virginia M., for example, the court simply concludes that Section 70 
of the Domestic Relations Law allows parents of children to seek 
visitation after the dissolution of their relationships with the 
children’s custodians.286  Despite the dissent’s searching 
examination of the court’s power to interpret Section 70 liberally, 
the majority quite simply “decline[d] petitioner’s invitation” to do 
so.287  No explanation needed; no further inquiry entertained.  
However, such an assumption that potentially new questions in 
family law are beyond the ken of the court has clear consequences 
and is itself an authoritative choice.  Bound up into it are notions 
about what the statute means, how the petitioner’s relationship to 
the child can be understood, and how the law ought to operate.  
Tied together, these considerations make up an unspoken 
authoritative moment making possible, and comprehensible, the 
court’s rather abrupt conclusion. 
This moment, whether developed and examined at length, 
skimmed through with little reflection, or even seemingly taken for 
granted, presages the court’s analysis of the case because its 
conceptualization of the issue at hand is informed by the 
inextricable interweaving of the substantive law, analogical framing, 
and sense of its own authority to intervene.  The metaphor of the 
 
 285. In fact, when reading some of these opinions it is possible to discern the 
outcome from methodological cues long before the court begins its substantive 
analysis of the facts and law.  When the Bicknell court announces early on that “in 
spite of the unique circumstances involved, the only issue before us is whether the 
appellants’ request to change their surnames is reasonable and proper,” there 
seems little doubt that the court will find the question of gay marriage irrelevant 
and accordingly permit the lesbian petitioners to change their surnames.  In re 
Bicknell, 771 N.E.2d 846, 847-48 (Ohio 2002).  Less obviously methodological, but 
no less telling, is the Littleton court’s musing about whether gender is “fixed by our 
Creator at birth.”  Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).  
Positioned as a question of divine plan, the court’s conclusion that it ought not 
involve itself in altering the sex designated for the plaintiff at birth, id. at 230-31, 
seems foreordained. 
 286. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991). 
 287. Id. 
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braid takes on especial meaning here.  In a braid, the twining of 
the different strands in relation to each other constructs a fiber 
much stronger and more resilient than a single thread.  A court’s 
interweaving of inherited law, fact, and methodology fashions a 
determination that is far more difficult to fray than simple 
dependence upon precedent alone.  At the very least, precedent is 
never alone in these cases—it always depends upon some kind of 
framing of the facts and statement of the court’s authority in order 
to determine whether queer families are legible within legal 
frameworks.288 
The imagery in the braid analysis suggests that it is almost 
impossible to look at one of these strands in isolation.  Focusing on 
one element’s effect on a judicial opinion raises the question of 
how another element is also in play, rendering the discussion 
unidimensional and oversimplified.  That is not to say that I am 
arguing that politicized social forces are solely responsible for 
shaping judicial decisions.  Rather, I am arguing for the 
simultaneity of the social, the legal, the methodological, the 
factual, and the precedential, and it is this simultaneity that shapes 
what courts do and how judges think.  Certainly, queer family law is 
inherently politicized, so the relationship between the judicial and 
the political is particularly highlighted, since these cases push at 
the boundaries of established statutory and common law. 
I began this Article speculating about how one might map the 
mind of the court.  Of course, we cannot map the mind of any 
court entirely.  But if we can start to untangle the threads in the 
judicial opinions and examine the shape, color, and texture of 
each one individually, then at the very least we can begin to 
understand how they are woven together.  This understanding can 
arm not just litigators but judges themselves with a better 
vocabulary and a richer conceptual sense of the options available to 
them in reviewing precedent, framing the facts, and defining their 
authority.  At best, judges will face the decision-making process with 
more self-consciousness and more honesty about what it is they are 
 
 288. And just as strands of differing girths may be braided to one another, so, 
too, can the varying analytical strands that I am discussing have differing weights 
in any given opinion.  Which explains why the weights of each strand may be at 
least somewhat inversely related; where the analogical framing in a particular case 
suggests that there is a long way to go to find in favor of the queer litigants, for 
example, it is far more likely that a strong methodological analysis (and 
consequent conclusion that the court ought not weigh in on the matter) will 
resolve the issue. 
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doing. 
Thus, in many ways this analysis complicates the by-now 
clichéd distinction between “activist” and “conservative” judges, 
since all judicial decisions reflect both political outlook and legal 
structures; indeed, they do so inevitably and inextricably.  The 
rhetoric of “judicial activism” obscures the ways in which all judges 
deploy precedent, facts, and methodological inquiry in ways that 
mirror or even amplify their sense of the social order, if only to 
affirm the status quo. 
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